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Abstract 
Project finance is a defined structure for developing new activity which involves establishing 
the project as a separate unit. The review of literature exhibits the distinctive characteristics of 
project finance and provides a rationale of this form of financing. Project finance entails 
financial modelling, risk management, legal aspects and the creation of a financial structure. 
The thesis explores practical use of project finance in a case study of a photovoltaic power 
plant and presents a financial model looking into central drivers of financial viability in a 
project. The thesis finds that there is consensus between theory and practice regarding the 
advantages of risk management facilitated by project finance.  
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Preface 
Project finance is a technique for financing new activity that not only involves raising funds, 
but also includes financial modelling, engineering, economics, environment and law. Project 
finance is a way of structuring all aspects of the project and is also referred to as “a seamless 
web that affects all aspects of a project’s development and contractual agreements, and thus 
the finance cannot be dealt with in isolation”1.  
The thesis is aimed at explaining what project finance involves, how it differs from other 
forms of financing structures, and the rationale for the use of project finance. Project finance 
will be considered from a theoretical perspective and a practical perspective. The practical 
aspects of project finance will be analysed in light of a case from the photovoltaic industry. 
The thesis attempts to compare theory and practice of project finance with regards to the 
photovoltaic industry. Photovoltaic power plants make use of the photovoltaic effect in order 
to generate electricity from sunlight.  
I chose project finance as the topic for my master thesis for various reasons. Project finance 
has become a significant area within the financial sector and is a topic with high practical 
relevance. The total capital raised in project finance has increased over the years and reached 
a record of 320.9 billion USD in 2008, most of which was invested in the energy sector and 
infrastructure sector. Project finance also contributes to the promotion of renewable energy 
technologies, which is an especially interesting topic of current interest.   
The thesis attempts to discuss the central aspects of project finance, but naturally there are 
interesting areas which could be given more attention. For instance, the importance of project 
finance in public-private infrastructure projects, and the distinction between limited recourse 
and non-recourse project debt. The latter is likely to have an effect on the terms for project 
debt.  
Section 1 of the thesis defines project finance and presents relevant theory on the subject. 
Section 2 deals with project finance and risk. Section 3 provides background information on 
                                                 
1 YESCOMBE, E. R. 2002. Principles of project finance, Amsterdam; London and New York: 
Elsevier Science, Academic Press. 
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renewables and photovoltaic technology, while section 4 examines how photovoltaic projects 
are financed. This section contains information about recently project financed deals and 
presents a review of term sheets of project finance loans. Section 5 investigates how project 
finance is conducted in reality by reviewing a real life case from the photovoltaic industry. A 
financial model for photovoltaic projects is presented and analysed in section 6. Section 7 
provides a comparison of project finance in theory and practice, while a summary of key 
findings is given in section 8.  
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1. Project finance 
1.1 Introduction 
Project finance is a defined procedure for financing new activity which entails financial 
modelling, a web of contracts, the involvement of many parties and high lender participation. 
Esty and Christov (2002) define project finance as the following:  
“Project finance involves a corporate sponsor investing in and owning a single purpose, 
industrial asset (usually with a limited life) through a legally-independent entity financed with 
non-recourse debt”.  
This definition highlights three important features of project finance. First, the project is 
created to accomplish one particular task. Second, the project is established as an independent 
unit separate from the sponsoring company. And third, the debt raised for the project is 
usually non-recourse, sometimes limited recourse, with regards to the sponsoring company. 
This means the project itself is responsible for the debt. The sponsoring company, also 
referred to as sponsor or parent company, is the company who initiates the project.  
1.2 Project finance history 
According to Gatti (2008) project finance was used to finance imports and exports already 
during the Roman Empire. Project loans were also used to finance trading expeditions from 
Europe to Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first large scale application of 
project finance was the development of oil fields in the North Sea in the 1970s. In recent 
years, project finance is applied in cooperation between public and private sector known as 
public-private partnerships (PPP). These projects are typically large infrastructure projects 
where the private sector builds a facility that is later transferred to the public sector. 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2002) these projects are an application of project finance 
because they involve the establishment of a special purpose project company with high 
leverage which directly relies on the revenues from the project to cover its financing costs.  
Project finance as a way of structuring and financing projects has had a growing importance 
over the last three decades. In the 1970s project finance was mainly used for natural resource 
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development. In the 1980s the use of this form of financing increased when new legislation on 
power purchase in the US made project financing the preferred structure for independent 
power producers. Project financing is often used for large-scale projects in infrastructure, 
natural resource and electric power which typically are capital-intensive, large-scale 
operations. Over the last 20 years, privatisation, deregulation and globalisation have lead to 
increased use of project finance. Former state-owned companies have been privatised, 
deregulation has taken place in industries such as the power sector, and expansion of markets 
caused by globalisation has increased the attractiveness of project finance. In developing 
countries the use of project finance has become wide-spread due to lack of other ways to raise 
funds for infrastructure. Because of high political risk in these countries, the projects face 
several challenges.  
Today, project finance is utilised in infrastructure, energy and power, and manufacturing 
facilities among other sectors. According to Project Finance Magazine (2010b) global project 
finance amounted to 292.5 billion USD in 2009, which is a reduction of 9 % compared to 
2008. In 2009, 81 % of the funding raised for project finance deals was debt financing. 
Energy was the leading sector in 2009, as in the previous years, representing 36 % of the 
global project finance volume. Within this sector, renewable energy was the only sub-sector 
to experience increased project finance volume in 2009 compared to 2008. Energy as a whole 
had a reduction of 5 % from 2008 to 2009, whereas renewable energy increased with 7 % in 
the same period.  
1.3 Key features of project finance 
Organisational structure 
An important feature of project finance is the organisational structure. The project company is 
a separate legal unit, independent from the sponsor company who initiated the project. The 
project company is sometimes known as a “special purpose vehicle”, established to perform 
one particular task. Esty (2003) finds that a project typically has one to three sponsors 
providing equity as well as management and directors on the board of the project company.  
Recourse 
Project finance debt is either non-recourse or limited recourse to the sponsor company. In the 
case of non-recourse, the sponsor has no responsibility for the debt in the project company. 
This is known as pure off-balance sheet-financing. With limited recourse, the sponsor has 
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some liability. This limited guarantee may apply within a specified time span, for a specified 
fraction of the debt or until a certain target has been reached
2
. Limited or non-recourse means 
that lenders must look solely to the cash flows from the project for repayment. This feature of 
project finance provides protection of the sponsor’s other cash flows and assets. Increased 
recourse leads to higher risk for the sponsor and affects the debt to asset ratio and possibly 
credit rating of the parent company
3
.  
High leverage 
Project companies typically have very high leverage. In a sample of project companies Esty 
(2003) found an average debt level of 70 %, whereas public corporations of the same size had 
an average debt level around 30 %. Project finance takes advantage of the fact that debt is less 
costly than equity because lenders require a lower rate of return due to the characteristics of 
debt. An increased debt level however, increases the risk of the equity and hence, the cost of 
equity.  
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) compare project finance loans to other syndicated credits. 
They find that project finance loans have longer average maturity, are more likely to have a 
fixed interest rate, and more often involve third-party guarantees. Project finance loans also 
involve more banks, have fewer covenants, and are more often priced at a fixed rate than 
floating rate. According to Kleimeier and Megginson the reason why project finance loans 
have fewer covenants, lies in the nature of the projects. Covenants are put in place to protect 
the creditors from asset substitution and other forms of wealth transfer, which is more 
probable in complex corporations with numerous divisions than in special purpose vehicles 
with one specified project. The borrowers of these loans are often found in tangible-asset-rich 
industries, for example oil and gas, real estate and electric utilities. The study also finds that 
project finance loans are more likely to be subject to currency risk and are located in riskier 
countries than other loans. Kleimeier and Megginson illustrate typical differences in level of 
country risk with an example; if a typical syndicated loan is issued to a borrower in Sweden, a 
fixed asset based loan would be arranged for a borrower in Singapore, whereas the project 
finance loan would go to a project based in Bahrain.  
 
                                                 
2 Esty and Christov (2002), p. 2  
3 Farrell (2003) 
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When they looked at loans with a floating rate, Kleimeier and Megginson found that these 
loans have lower credit spreads compared to other syndicated loans, despite their non-
recourse nature. This contradicts the general belief that project finance loans are more 
expensive than other loans. They explain this result with one of the motivations behind the 
use of project finance; that project finance reduces agency costs. (This and other benefits of 
project finance will be elaborated on in further sections.) Project finance loans also entail 
more participants and have higher fee levels, indicating that project finance is perceived to be 
more risky. The banks require higher fees in order to participate, and less willing to hold large 
shares of the total debt compared to other loan arrangements. The higher fees may influence 
the perception of project finance being expensive, despite the fact that the credit spreads are 
lower.  
 
The study by Kleimeier and Megginson also contain a regression analysis, examining what 
factors affect the spread of project finance loans and other types of syndicated credits. The 
analysis reveals that project finance spreads are affected by third-party guarantees to a larger 
extent than other loans. This demonstrates the importance of guarantees in project finance 
arrangements, and why sponsors are willing to spend time and money on obtaining these from 
counterparties; compared to other loans, the third-party guarantees lead to higher reduction in 
the spread.  
 
Based on a study of project finance loans conducted by Standard & Poor suggesting project 
finance loans have better performance in default situations than comparable corporate loans, 
Beale et al (2002) derive several characteristics of project finance loans. The underlying study 
shows that project finance loans have a lower loss given default and lower expected loss than 
comparable corporate loans. Beale et al attribute much of the explanation of this to the 
covenants of project finance loans. These include “step-in-rights” allowing the lenders to take 
over the contract, restrictions on drawdowns and use of proceeds, mandatory prepayments in 
the lenders’ favour, and restrictions on additional debt. Corporate loans also include such 
covenants, but in the case of project finance, the covenants are tighter, providing early signals 
to the lenders if creditworthiness is deteriorating. Beale et al emphasise the banks’ favourable 
negotiation position. Being the primary source of loan capital for projects enables the banks to 
implement covenants that protect their interests. The study investigates the probability of 
project loans defaulting, and finds that they can be compared to BBB+ rated corporate loans 
in the long term, and loans of BB+ rating in the short term. The inconsistency between short 
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and long term is explained by the fact that project finance loans become less risky as they 
reach maturity.  
 
Importance of contracts 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced the idea of considering the firm as “the nexus of a set 
of contracting relationships”4. This view is especially suitable for project finance because of 
the extensive use of contracts. Contracts are used to govern the relations to other parties such 
as contractors, suppliers, sponsors, the government, customers and lenders. With numerous 
parties involved it is important to have contracts delegating responsibilities, distributing risk 
and defining the purpose of the project’s cash flows. Because of this, project finance is 
sometimes referred to as “contract finance”. Figure 1 illustrates key participants and contracts 
in a typical project finance structure.  
 
Figure 1 Illustration of project participants and contracts.  
The importance of contracts in project finance is considerable because they provide credit 
support. Because project finance debt typically has non- or limited recourse, agreements, 
licenses and guarantees become part of what lenders take into account when deciding the debt 
capacity of the project. Khan and Parra (2003) list the following as central contracts: 
                                                 
4 Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 311 
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Concession agreement, off-take agreement, site purchase or lease agreement, construction 
contract, operations and maintenance (O&M) agreement and input supply contracts.   
Concession agreements are used in situations where the project company “provides a service 
to a public authority or directly to the general public”5. Examples are construction and 
operation of bridges, toll roads or airports. An off-take contract applies in situations where the 
project’s production is sold to an off-taker, for example a power producer selling electricity.  
Khan and Parra divide the construction contract into three general parts; engineering, 
procurement and construction. In the case of all three areas covered in one contract, this is 
called an EPC contract. The EPC contract describes the scope of the project, including design, 
technical specifications, criteria for performance, a fixed schedule for progress and a fixed 
price. In some cases, the contract also includes installation, in which the contract is called 
EPCI contract.  
The O&M contract contains requirements regarding budget limits, health and safety 
standards, operating standards, routine inspections, and emergency repairs. Input supply 
contracts share many of the features of an off-take contract; it specifies technical requirements 
and in some cases volume and price of e.g. raw materials.  
Risk management  
The capital structure combined with the contracts contributes to distributing the risks involved 
in the project between all parties involved, not only the sponsors. The web of contracts 
allocates different risks to the party with the best understanding of that particular risk.  
The EPC contract contributes to risk management in several aspects; Khan and Parra describe 
how this is accomplished. The risks of cost overruns, delays and hidden defects are mitigated 
through a series of measures. The contract often contains a fixed price and a fixed schedule 
the contractor has agreed to, as well as a “takeover” test in order to discover any problems. 
Withholding a fraction of the payment to the contractor until the warranty period expires 
reduces the risk of loss due to contractor defaulting during the warranty period. The EPC 
contract often includes a liability cap limiting the potential claims on the contractor to a 
certain amount.  
                                                 
5 Yescombe (2002), p. 69 
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The other types of contracts contribute to risk management in the same manner as the EPC 
contract. The off-take contract primarily reduces market risk because it guarantees a minimum 
level of revenue. Correspondingly, the input supply contract reduces price risk of required raw 
materials.  
1.4 Sources of project finance  
Providers of project financing include, according to Farrell (2003), commercial banks, leasing 
companies, insurance companies, pension funds, governmental bond authorities, finance 
companies, export credits, international financing agencies, private lenders, and customers. 
The main sources of funds are equity and debt, in addition comes the possibility of lease 
finance and government support.  
 
Equity  
The equity in the project company is provided by the sponsoring companies. As mentioned 
earlier, equity is held by one or a few sponsors and constitutes a smaller fraction of the capital 
structure, typically around 30 %. Since equity has residual claim on any distributions, the risk 
of equity is higher than debt, which has first priority. Therefore, the required return from 
equity investors is higher. Equity also has control rights in the form of voting rights. Gatti 
describes four types of sponsors; industrial sponsors, public sponsors, contractors, and purely 
financial sponsors. The first group consists of companies looking to extend their business 
either way in the value chain. The next group are governments and municipalities interested in 
increasing social welfare. The third type of investors is contractors or suppliers who wish to 
invest in the project in addition to participating later. This can be an effective way to 
incentivise an EPC contractor as he will benefit from finishing construction on time not only 
as a contractor, but also as a shareholder in the SPV, which then can start generating cash 
flows. For the fourth group of investors the project is like any other investment, their reason 
for investing in the project is solely to gain a return on their equity contribution.  
 
Even though the debt has limited or non-recourse to the sponsor company, the sponsors still 
have an impact on the project, and are of great importance to the lenders. Lenders wish to 
have long-term sponsors who involve themselves in the project. From the banks’ perspective, 
this contributes to ensuring project success. It is also even required in the loan agreement that 
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the ownership of the project remains unchanged, at least for a certain period. For the banks, it 
is important that the sponsors have enough incentives to support the project. Yescombe argues 
that a reasonable amount of equity invested in the project and a reasonable return on the 
investment provide such incentives. The first ensures that the sponsors protect the project 
from failure, and the latter gives the sponsors reason to continue their involvement.  
 
Debt 
Project finance debt can be raised from banks or the bond market. In 2001 133 billion USD 
was raised as project finance debt, out of which 80 % was bank debt and the remaining 20 % 
was raised from the bond market. From the borrower’s perspective there is little difference 
between issuing bank debt and bonds, both entail promised payments of principal and interest 
or coupons. The major difference, according to Yescombe, is that bonds are more liquid than 
bank loans because they are tradable instruments. Bonds also have lower priority than bank 
debt. In reality, however, this difference is not as important as many project bonds are sold as 
private placements and loans are in fact traded between banks. Bonds attract institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds in addition to banks.  
 
Figure 2 displays the mandated arrangers in project finance loans in from May 2009 to May 
2010
6
. State Bank of India is ranked number 1, the loan volume of 21,632m USD from 47 
deals represent 10.7 % of the total amount during the period.  
                                                 
6 From projectfinancemagazine.com 
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Figure 2 Mandated arrangers of project finance loans 2009-2010  
 
Lease finance  
Leasing is an alternative to purchasing assets and can be considered an addition to issuing 
debt or equity. In leasing the initial outlay is less than the purchase price, but it resembles debt 
financing because it entails a series of fixed payments over a certain period of time. 
Depending on the nature of the lease contract, a distinction is made between operating and 
financial leases. Copeland et al (2005) explain this difference; operating leases include 
financing and maintenance services, is not fully amortised and have a cancelation clause. A 
financial lease on the other hand, does not include maintenance services, is fully amortised 
and cannot be cancelled before expiration. Fully amortised means that the rental payments the 
lessor is entitled to equals the total price of the asset. From an accounting perspective, 
operating leases are off-balance sheet financing (future lease obligations must be disclosed) 
whereas financial leases must be shown on the balance sheet.  
According to Yescombe the advantages of lease finance in project finance is related to tax 
benefits. Project-financed ventures often do not generate sufficient taxable profit in the first 
years to fully exploit the benefit of tax-related depreciation. Lease finance enables the lessor 
(i.e. the company who owns the lease object) to obtain the tax benefit which in turn is 
0
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beneficial for the lessee (i.e. the party who leases the object) through reduced leasing costs. 
Another benefit for the project company is the transfer of equipment risk to the leasing 
company.  
Government support 
Government support available for project exists in various forms. According to Khan and 
Parra, governments provide financial support through government guarantees, equity 
participation, government debt, grants and preferential tax treatment. Government guarantees 
and financial support play an important role especially for the development of new 
technologies. In addition to governmental initiatives, bilateral institutions also play a part in 
project finance; either in the form of Export Credit Agencies (ECA) or investment promotion 
agencies. ECAs provide direct loans as well as guarantees and insurance to encourage exports 
from the respective home country.  
1.5 Project finance and other financing structures 
The main difference between corporate finance and project finance is that while the entire 
corporate balance sheet is considered when determining debt capacity and defining collateral 
in the case of corporate financing, only the project itself is responsible for project finance 
debt. A summary of the differences between corporate finance and project finance is shown in 
table 1.  
In addition to differences in collateral, the accounting treatment differs between the two 
structures. Whereas corporate finance debt is presented on-balance sheet, project finance, 
under certain conditions, are off-balance sheet for the sponsor. The main variable considered 
when deciding the project’s debt capacity, is future cash flows to the project. In comparison, 
corporate debt capacity is affected by the soundness of the whole company, its relations to 
customers, profitability of all activities, and its assets. Finnerty argues that control and 
monitoring differs in corporate finance and project finance. In a conventional organisation the 
management is in control, and monitoring is done by the board of directors, rarely by the 
investors directly. In project financed ventures, management control is limited and monitoring 
increased. The transparent nature of project companies and the covenants imposed by project 
debt enables the creditors to perform closer monitoring, and reduces managerial discretion. 
Financial flexibility is another area where the two structures deviate. Finnerty argues that 
financing can be arranged quicker in corporate finance compared to project financed where 
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the process is more time-consuming due to a thorough due diligence process and contractual 
negotiations.  
 Corporate finance Project finance 
Collateral for financing Assets of the borrower Project assets 
Accounting treatment of 
equity at sponsor level 
On-balance sheet. Off-balance sheet (the only 
effect is the cash outlay to 
subscribe the equity in the 
SPV). 
Main variables considered 
when granting credit 
Customer relations, financial 
soundness, profitability, 
company assets. 
Future cash flows. 
Sustainable leverage Depends on the effects on the 
borrower’s balance sheet.  
Depends on the cash flow 
generated by the project 
(leverage is usually greater).  
Control and monitoring Control is vested primarily in 
management. Board of directors 
monitors performance on behalf 
of the shareholders. Limited 
direct monitoring by investors. 
Management remains control, 
but is subject to closer 
monitoring. Contractual 
agreements governing the debt 
and equity investments contain 
covenants and other provisions 
that facilitate monitoring.  
Financial flexibility  Financing can typically be 
arranged quickly.  
Higher information, 
contracting, and transaction 
costs are involved.  
Sources: Caselli and Gatti(2005),  Finnerty (2007) 
Table 1 Comparison of corporate finance and project finance 
Esty and Christov (2002) compares project finance with other financing structures. Project 
finance can be similar to joint ventures, but unless the funding is non-recourse, it is identical. 
Secured debt has recourse to corporate assets, and leveraged-buy-outs (LBOs) lack a 
corporate sponsor in order to de defined as project finance. Project holding companies may 
qualify as project finance, but Esty points out that as the number of projects in such 
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companies increase, cross-collateralisation increases and they are more similar to 
corporations.   
1.6 Rationale for use of project finance 
Traditional theory on capital structure argues that firm value is unaffected by financing. This 
was stated by Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their irrelevance proposition: 
 “The market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by 
capitalising its expected return at the rate ρk appropriate to its class.”  
This proposition however, relies on a number of assumptions. The theory on project finance 
contradicts this proposition and suggests that firm value can be increased as a result of how 
the project is structured. Both Esty (1999) and Shah and Thakor (1987) explain this 
inconsistency as a breach of Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions. Esty argues that in the real 
world there are taxes, transaction costs, costs of financial distress and costs related to 
asymmetric information and incentive conflicts. He argues that project finance creates value 
because it reduces the costs of these market imperfections.  
Brealey et al (1998) describe how project finance address agency problems and contributes to 
risk management, while Shah and Thakor look at how project financing allows higher 
leverage and reduces the creditors’ screening costs. Esty argues that project finance eliminates 
four sources of investment distortions. I will in turn look at these theories.  
1.6.1 Brealey et al – Agency costs 
Agency relationships take place when an agent is set to perform certain tasks on behalf of a 
principal. Agency costs arise when the incentives of the agent are not aligned with those of 
the principal. Typically the agent will act in his best interest, not according to what is the 
principal’s best interest. The principal cannot observe the agent’s actions and information 
directly and it is difficult for the principal to prevent such behaviour since writing complete 
contracts is expensive, if not impossible. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that it is 
reasonable to assume that this will happen, given that both are utility maximisers. They define 
agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenses the principal initiates, the bonding 
expenditures caused by the agent’s actions, and a loss in wealth caused by the agent not 
pursuing the principal’s wishes. Bonding expenses are caused by the agent’s attempt to prove 
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his commitment to the principal’s goal. Examples of such expenses are costs of reporting and 
auditing. The reporting is carried out to document the agent’s effort and auditing is conducted 
to obtain outside approval of this documentation. Brealey et al argue that project finance can 
reduce the agency problems through contracts distributing risks between the project 
participants and by giving important incentives.  
Jensen (1986) describes situations where agency costs arise because of free cash flow. Jensen 
defines free cash flow as “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have 
positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. Managers can 
sometimes have incentives to make the company grow beyond what is the optimal size in the 
owners’ perspective. Examples of reasons for this can be empire building or compensations 
plans where remuneration depends on growth. Jensen argues that in such situations debt can 
have a disciplining effect. Having debt as a part of the capital structure commits the manager 
to making repayments and reduces the cash flow available for spending on negative NPV-
investments, pet projects or other purposes not in the best interest of the principal.  
Brealey et al argue that while Jensen’s theory reduces the agency problem, it does not explain 
why debt should be located in a project company rather than with the sponsor itself. They put 
forward two possible reasons for why the location of debt is relevant. The first explanation is 
that placing the debt in a project company eases monitoring compared with including the debt 
in the existing parent company. The other explanation applies in situations with more than one 
sponsor and where the sponsors have differing opinions on how cash in the project should be 
spent. Having debt then mitigates conflicts since free cash flow is determined for debt service. 
Project finance contributes with new ways of solving these agency problems compared to 
corporate finance. Whereas some measures can be useful in corporate finance, others are more 
appropriate for project finance.  
In corporate finance takeover-threats help discipline managers. Projects however, are 
privately owned and the market for project takeovers is less liquid compared to corporate 
takeovers. Measures that are better suited in project finance are corporate governance, 
concentrated ownership, separate incorporation and contracts. Setting up a new project 
organisation enables the sponsoring company to design a new corporate governance system 
which can better address the specific challenges of the project organisation. A tailored 
governance system can be more efficient in handling project-specific problems.  
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The concentrated ownership of project organisations with only one or a few sponsors gives 
stronger incentives for monitoring the project. In more disperse ownership structures; free-
riding on other owners when it comes to monitoring costs is likely. With only one or a few 
sponsors, this is avoided in project finance. The debt in project companies also encourages 
monitoring. The debt is usually bank debt, not public bonds, giving stronger incentives for 
monitoring. The fact that the project is a separate unit and therefore more transparent, eases 
the supervision and reduces monitoring costs. Another mechanism that helps reduce agency 
costs is the extensive use of contracts in project finance. Contracts regulate several relations 
and decide the purpose of the project’s cash flows. In all, this monitoring helps improve 
performance, reducing the need for discipline from the market for corporate control. 
Jensen’s theory predicts that there are agency costs connected to having large free cash flows 
Project companies often have high leverage and therefore reduced free cash flows available 
for non-optimal purposes. In addition, project companies have few growth opportunities; they 
are established to perform one task and investing in other projects is irrelevant.  
The agency cost motivation explains how project finance reduces agency costs based on the 
features of project finance and less free cash flow. This cost reduction leads to increased 
project value compared to organising the project as a part of the sponsor company.  
1.6.2 Shah and Thakor – optimal capital structure 
Shah and Thakor develop a theory on optimal capital structure showing that high risk firms 
will issue more debt and pay higher interest rates than what is the case for low risk firms. 
Further, they present a rationale for project finance.  
The first part of Shah and Thakor’s paper shows how riskier firms choose higher debt levels 
and pay higher interest rates. Their model assumes two types of firms; high risk firms and low 
risk firms. The true level of risk is only known by the firm itself, i.e. there is asymmetric 
information, and releasing information to the capital market about the risk level is 
prohibitively costly. The reasoning behind their result is that high risk firms have incentives to 
understate the level of risk they face because this will give them lower interest rates on debt. 
To avoid untruthful reporting, the banks offer higher debt levels to induce these companies to 
report higher levels of risk. The banks will offer low risk firms low interest rates to prevent 
them from mimicking the high risk firms. The high risk firms have a greater probability of 
achieving very high returns, and therefore high tax-deductible interests are more valuable for 
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the high risk firms than the low risk firms. The differing motivations lead to a perfectly 
separating equilibrium where high risk firms have high leverage and high interest rates. Low 
risk firms are granted lower leverage and lower interest rates.  
This contradicts existing theory claiming there is an inverse relationship between leverage and 
risk, since expected bankruptcy costs increase with the riskiness of the firm and the marginal 
tax rate does not vary with risk.  
In the second part of their paper, Shah and Thakor link this result to project finance. Now, 
their model allows information production at a certain cost. Therefore, the firms can either 
release information to the market about firm risk, or reveal the risk level through their choice 
of capital structure, as described above. The two alternatives are in the following referred to 
as “information production” and “revelation game”. The actual information production is 
carried out by the creditors, but in equilibrium the cost will be borne by the firm. In a situation 
where a firm chooses to finance a new project within the company (i.e. corporate finance), 
information must be produced about the whole company. Creditors might have difficulties 
separating the project’s cash flows from the cash flows from other operations in the firm. This 
gives the company an opportunity to mislead creditors.  
This is a classic case of asymmetric information, as described by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
When managers have information that outsiders do not have, managers can in some situations 
decide to not undertake an investment, even though it has a positive NPV (net present value). 
This is because the financial market is unable to separate between companies in a good and 
bad state, and because management maximises the value of the old shareholders’ shares. Debt 
and equity will be priced correctly on average, but firms in a good state will experience 
underpriced equity and overpriced debt. If the NPV of the project is not high enough to 
compensate for the mispricing, the firm will reject the project. In their model Myers and 
Majluf derive a pecking order theory of financing, stating that firms first prefer using internal 
funds, secondarily debt and last equity.  
Another consequence of asymmetric information, which can arise in this situation, is asset 
substitution. Asset substitution happens when a company can invest in two possible projects; 
one being low-risk, the other high-risk. The bank lending the company the necessary funds, 
however, is only aware of the first project and believes the loan will be spent on the low-risk 
project. After obtaining financing, the managers of the firm, whose goal is to maximise 
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shareholder value, will choose to invest in the high-risk project. The reason for this is that risk 
is favourable for equity because equity is a residual claim. Higher risk increases the upside 
potential, whereas the downside is capped because of limited liability. Asset substitution 
causes risk shifting from equity holders to debt holders, and consequently a wealth transfer 
from debt holders to equity holders. In a market with rational participants, lenders will predict 
this asset substitution ex ante, and either refuse to finance the project or introduce debt 
covenants restricting the company to choose the safer project. Project finance prevents asset 
substitution because of the use of detailed covenants and lender control initiated by the banks 
and thorough due diligence performed before signing the loan contract.   
If the company chooses project finance instead of corporate finance, the problems of 
asymmetric information is reduced, since the creditors then only have to produce information 
about the new project. Asset substitution is also more easily avoided, since separate 
incorporation increases transparency and eases creditors’ monitoring of the project. Project 
finance is valuable because it reduces the screening costs.  
The alternative to information production according to Shah and Thakor’s theory is to engage 
in the revelation game and report the true risk level in order to achieve beneficial terms on the 
debt. In this case, project finance is beneficial if it can lead to higher leverage. As described 
above, Shah and Thakor claim riskier firms can obtain higher leverage when they disclose 
their true level of risk. Project finance is therefore valuable whenever the riskiness of the 
project is higher than the riskiness of the company as a whole after initiating the project, 
because the sponsor can gain higher leverage when the project is established as a separate 
unit.  
Shah and Thakor conclude that creditors in project financed ventures will by highly involved, 
and that the riskiest investments will use project finance. According to their work, the 
motivation behind the use of project finance is to minimise unwanted consequences of 
asymmetric information.   
 
1.6.3 Esty – investment distortions  
Esty (1999) describes how project finance mitigates four types of investment distortions; 
overinvestment in negative NPV projects, overinvestment in high-risk negative NPV projects, 
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underinvestment in positive NPV projects, and underinvestment in risky, positive NPV 
projects. The first category is the same free cash flow problem as Brealey et al address in their 
article. The second investment distortion concerns risk shifting, which corresponds to the 
asset substitution problem described by Shah and Thakor. The third category concerns a 
problem known as debt overhang. The fourth investment distortion is underinvestment in 
risky, positive NPV project due to managerial risk aversion. Project finance solves this by 
isolating the project in a separate company and hence avoids risk contamination. Debt 
overhang and risk management in project finance is described in detail in the following 
paragraphs.   
Debt overhang  
Myers (1977) argues that in certain situations, having debt in place can cause a company to 
forego new investments, even when they are profitable, because the market value of the 
equity will be reduced. If the sponsoring company already has debt, taking on a new and 
profitable project will subsidise older debt claims and lead to a transfer of wealth. Managers 
will predict this wealth transfer from equity holders to the creditors, and since they act on 
behalf of equity holders, they will choose not to invest. Financing the project separately 
solves this underinvestment problem. Project financing brings in new capital and avoids 
subsidising debt with higher seniority.  
Risk management  
Project finance contributes to risk management mainly in two ways; it reduces potential 
collateral damage on the company’s other activities, and it provides useful tools for better risk 
handling. Esty (2002) explains how a risky investment can affect a company’s other business: 
“Investment in a risky asset exposes a firm to the possibility of risk contamination, the 
phenomenon whereby a failed investment drags an otherwise healthy firm into default. Even 
short of default, a failing investment can impose serious collateral damage.” 
Keeping the project separate from the parent company protects the company if the project 
should default. In the case of non-recourse debt there is no financial risk for the sponsoring 
company, beyond the contributed share of equity. When the debt has limited recourse the 
sponsoring company has limited liability for the debt and will be affected to some extent in 
case of default. Separate incorporation enables the parent company to start up a project 
without exposing their other activities to the risks inherent in the new project. The risk 
management motivation is important not only in the extreme case of default, but also if the 
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project underperforms compared to expectations. Investing in a risky project increases the 
volatility of the company’s cash flows and leads to increased costs of external financing. 
Increased volatility also reduces the expected value of the tax shield. In addition, there are 
reputation effects influencing the opinions of suppliers, customers and employees. Suppliers 
and customers may become more reluctant to conducting business with the company if they 
believe the risk of default is increased as a result of taking on a more risky project. Employees 
may for the same reason be unwilling to invest their human capital in the company. Esty 
(2003) defines the consequences above as deadweight costs. If the sum of the deadweight 
costs is higher than the NPV of the project, the company will choose to forgo the investment. 
Financing the investment as a separate project avoids these deadweight costs.   
According to Esty there is a trade-off between keeping the project separate in order to protect 
the parent company, and gaining co-insurance in the case of incorporating the project with the 
company’s other businesses. Co-insurance is obtained in large corporations when cash flows 
from various projects are pooled together and provide cross-collateralisation in case one 
project performs poorly. Esty (1999) criticises those who claim that isolation of project risk is 
an advantage of project finance, without paying any attention to lost co-insurance. Believing 
the sponsors can take part in upside potential without any loss compared to corporate finance, 
is according to Esty, a “free lunch fallacy”. The recourse feature does not only protect the 
sponsoring company from the project’s performance, but also vice versa, the project is 
protected if the sponsoring company should start performing poorly.  
The other aspect of risk management is risk handling. Esty argues that project finance is a tool 
providing risk sharing. With many parts involved in the project, risk can be allocated to the 
party best suited to handle the risk in question. Brealey et al (1998) give examples of how 
major risks are allocated through contracts. Since the project sponsors have best control of the 
overall progress, they are obligated through a facility management contract to make sure the 
project is completed on time and built and operated according to predefined standards. The 
main contractor has the responsibility of completing the project on schedule and within 
budget limits. This is regulated in the EPC contract which often specifies a fixed price and 
what penalties the contractor faces in the case of delays. In projects with one major supplier a 
long-term supply contract can mitigate the risk of the supplier taking advantage of his 
monopoly power. In situations with only one or a few customers revenue risk is a key 
concern. This risk can be handled in a long-term sales contract, for example with a take-or-
pay clause. In other projects, supporting infrastructure may be a concern. In those cases, an 
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agreement with the government can specify responsibility to build access roads or other forms 
of communication. This reduces the risk of the project failing due to lack of infrastructure. 
Brealey et al argue that such an allocation of risks is the most efficient because the use of 
contracts transfers risk to the party who is controlling the source of the risk.  
In contrast to traditional risk management, project finance utilises the organisational form 
when dealing with risk. Traditional strategies often include the use of derivatives or other 
financial instruments which may not be applicable for projects because the derivatives do not 
exist or are too costly.  
1.6.4 Other adavantages of project finance  
In addition to the above mentioned motivations for using project finance Brealey et al present 
a few other advantages. They emphasise the ability of project finance to specialise and 
decentralise management and the possibility of tailoring incentives for project managers.  
Yescombe argues that higher leverage increases investors’ returns on equity. Although this 
argument is correct, it disregards the offsetting impact on equity risk. Project finance can in 
some circumstances also have tax benefits. Esty argues that project’s sometimes can obtain 
tax benefits, e.g. tax credits or tax holidays, which it would not qualify for if it was part of a 
large corporation. Khan and Parra point at how projects can avoid double taxation. Another 
advantage they mention is how project finance can be utilised to avoid covenants on existing 
corporate debt. A company is typically restricted with regards to further indebtedness by 
covenants on the existing loan. Project finance allows the company to undertake a new project 
without leading to a breach of the existing loan agreement.  
 
1.6.5 Disadvantages of project finance 
So far, this thesis has focused on the advantages to and motivations behind the use of project 
finance. However, there are also costs to consider, and situations where project finance may 
be less suitable. Compared to conventional corporate finance, project finance is more time-
consuming and involves higher transaction cost. Establishing a separate project organisation 
takes, according to Esty (2003), from 6 to 18 months more than setting up the project within 
an existing organisation. In his article, Esty refers to studies showing that transaction costs 
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typically are 3-5 % of the amount invested, but can amount to 10 % for small and innovative 
projects. An illustrative project is the Petrozuata project, an oil field development project in 
Venezuela. According to Esty (1999) this deal took the sponsors over five years to negotiate. 
Later this project was awarded Deal of the Year and even Deal of the Decade by Project 
Finance Magazine. The legal and advisory costs in this 2.45 billion USD deal amounted to 15 
million, approximately 0.6 % of the investment. Financing and issuance costs were 17 
million, of this 12.5 million for the bond issues and 4.5 million for underwriting, commitment 
and participation fees for the bank debt. In total the fees represented 1.3 % of the investment 
cost. The use of internal resources such as time of the employees, are not included in these 
numbers, further increasing the actual costs.  
One of the reasons for the lengthy process and high transaction costs is the extensive use of 
contracts and documentation and consequently higher legal fees. Esty (2003) also argues that 
due to the loss of co-insurance, project debt is often more expensive than corporate debt, with 
spreads up to 400 basis points more. Although it may be true that project finance debt have 
higher margins, this reflects the higher risk associated with these loans. Therefore this is only 
a consequence of project finance and its higher leverage, not a disadvantage. Kleimeier and 
Megginson’s study in fact showed that when risk is accounted for, project finance loans have 
lower spreads than other loans.  
These disadvantages make project finance less suitable for smaller projects as smaller scale 
makes the structure less cost-efficient. However, Esty (1999) claims that simple projects that 
entail established technologies require less negotiation, and therefore make up for lack of 
scale.  
According to Khan and Parra project finance is time-consuming and will often lead to delays 
in financial closing because of the lengthy negotiation process. Hoffman (2008) discusses the 
disadvantages of increased lender supervision. Because the creditors take on greater risk in 
project finance, they will also demand greater oversight of the project. Increased creditor 
involvement involves monitoring covenants closely, strict reporting and documentation 
requirements. Both Hoffman and Khan and Parra argue that this leads to reduced managerial 
discretion.  
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1.7 Summary 
Project finance is more than a source of finance; it is a defined structure that involves special 
features separating project finance from other types of finance. An essential part of project 
finance is the separate incorporation of the project as an independent legal unit. This opens for 
issuing debt with limited or no recourse to the project sponsors, which is central in risk 
management. The capital structure in a project financed venture typically involves a high debt 
level, often as much as 70 – 80 % of the total capital. The debt is in most cases provided by 
commercial banks, but the bond market is also available for projects. The remainder of the 
capital structure is often equity provided by the sponsors, but capital can also be provided 
through lease finance and government support.  
Another important aspect of project finance is the wide-spread use of contracts. Project 
finance involves many participants, and contracts contribute to regulate relationships and 
define responsibilities. The contracts are part of what decides the financial strength of a 
project, and is considered by the banks when determining debt capacity. The future cash flows 
to a project are solely responsible for servicing debt because of limited recourse, and therefore 
off-take contracts are essential to the financial strength of a project.  
The use of contracts in project finance is central in risk management. The contracts distribute 
risks to the parties with the best understanding of each risk. The party who controls a risk 
source is often best able to handle that particular risk and is able to do so at the lowest cost. In 
all, this reduces total risk and the cost of risk mitigation. A central contract in this aspect is the 
EPC contract; since the EPC contactor controls the construction process, he is made 
responsible for the risk of delay and cost overruns.  
Project finance differs from corporate finance in several respects. When it comes to collateral 
for debt, all company assets are available for banks in traditional corporations, while only the 
project’s assets are available to debt holders in project finance. The debt capacity is 
determined by the profitability of the entire company in corporate finance, as opposed to 
project finance where future cash flows to the project are solely responsible for debt service, 
since there often is no recourse to the sponsors. These differences lead to advantages and 
disadvantages of both structures. Limited recourse reduces the possibility of risk 
contamination, but project financed ventures lose co-insurance gained in large corporations.  
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Different theories seek to explain the rationale for employing project finance. According to 
Miller and Modigliani’s classic finance theory, there should be no difference between 
establishing a project separately and within the existing organisation.  
One explanation is found in agency theory. Agency costs arise in companies with high free 
cash flows and cause overinvestment and increased spending on non-optimal purposes. 
Project finance solves the problem of free cash flow by utilising the disciplining effect of debt 
in the capital structure. Project financing involves high debt levels and therefore reduce the 
available cash flows. In addition, since the project company is established to perform one 
particular task, investing in other projects is often not an alternative. Corporate governance is 
another area where project finance contributes to reducing agency problems. Governance 
structures in project companies can be more efficient than in large corporations, because 
projects are smaller and more transparent and because the measures can be designed to handle 
project-specific problems.  
Another theory is that project finance reduces asymmetric information and hence eases 
problems with underinvestment and asset substitution. Asymmetric information can lead to 
undervaluation of profitable firms, and cause them to forego investments in positive NPV 
projects. Asymmetric information may also result in asset substitution which causes a wealth 
transfer from creditors to equity holders. Shah and Thakor explain how project finance 
enables firms with high-risk projects to obtain higher leverage than low risk firms. Creditors 
wish to induce firms to truthful reporting, and award high-risk firms higher leverage to state 
the true risk level, whereas low-risk firms is given lower interest rates. Shah and Thakor’s 
theory conclude that high risk projects will always use project finance.  
A third explanation looks at four scenarios distorting investment decisions. Two of these lead 
to overinvestment, the other two cause underinvestment. In all four cases the suboptimal 
investment reduces the firm value. Project finance is advantageous because it removes the 
source of the investment distortion. Hence, investment choices will be made on the right 
decision criteria, and firm value is maximised. The scenarios causing overinvestment are free 
cash flow problems and asset substitution, which are discussed in the agency theory 
explanation. Reasons for underinvestment are debt overhang and managerial risk aversion. 
Project finance contributes to easing these problems with separate incorporation and no pre-
existing debt and isolation of project risk.    
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Although these theories suggest project finance can lead to additional value, there is a trade-
off between the increase in value and the costs associated with project finance. The process of 
establishing a separate project company, discussing risk distribution with project participants 
and debt negotiations with the bank is time-consuming, and legal fees and advisory fees can 
amount to high costs.  
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2. Project finance and risk 
2.1 Introduction 
Damodaran (2003) defines risk as the likelihood of the return on an investment deviating from 
the expected outcome. This definition recognises that risks are not necessarily are negative, 
but can also have a positive effect on the result. According to Wiser et al (2004) it is 
important to distinguish between risk allocation and risk mitigation. The first concept refers 
to how the consequences of risks are being treated and who has to deal with them. Risk 
mitigation concerns reduction of risk and minimising of consequences. There are several ways 
of categorising risk. Esty (2002) provides a framework that divides risk into three groups; 
symmetric risks, asymmetric downside risks and binary risks. The categories refer to how the 
different sources of risk affect returns. Symmetric risks can affect results both positively and 
negatively, examples of such risks are market risk with regards to quantity and price, supply 
risk and competition risk. For example, sales can turn out to be higher or lower than projected, 
leading to higher or lower revenue respectively. Asymmetric downside risks are risks that can 
only cause a reduction in returns. This can be environmental risk or expropriation risk. The 
third category, binary risk, is risks with only two possible outcomes – success or failure. 
Examples include technology failure, counterparty failure, regulatory risk or force majeure.  
 
As mentioned in the section 1, Esty (1999) argues that risk management is one of the 
advantages of project finance; the financing structure allows distribution of risk to the party 
best equipped to handle that source of risk. Risk management is important in project finance 
for several reasons. Because of the limited or non-recourse feature of the debt, lenders will not 
accept an incautious handling of risks since a poor outcome will affect the project’s ability to 
service the debt. Furthermore, risks may have a greater impact in project finance settings 
compared to corporate finance. A delay in construction will affect only part of the business in 
the case of corporate finance and the company may have other sites that temporarily can take 
over. In project finance, however, the whole business is affected and the result may be default.  
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2.2 Project phases and risk  
The project life cycle can be divided into three phases; development, construction, and 
operation. In the development phase, contracts are being negotiated and financing secured. In 
the construction stage the funds are drawn and being used for the physical construction of the 
project. The third phase, operation, is when the commercial activity starts and the project 
generates revenue, which in turn is used for repayment of the debt. According to Yescombe 
(2002), the end of the development phase is known as “financial close”, whereas “commercial 
operation date” marks the end of the construction phase. The project company is not 
necessarily established at the beginning of the development stage since it has no purpose until 
the financing is finalised.  
As the project goes through the different phases, the risk profile changes. Hoffman (2008) 
argues that risks during construction and operation receive more focus than the risks in the 
development phase. The risk of not being able to service the debt is not applicable in the 
development phase, but there are still great consequences of the relevant risks at this stage. 
Many of risks in the development stage are binary, meaning that their outcome determines 
whether the project will be realised or not. Binary risks combined with the fact that project 
development often is very expensive, underline the significance of these risks. The 
development phase is funded by government grants, development loans, equity or a 
combination of the three.  
Among the risks listed by Hoffman are the risk of losing the rights to develop the project, 
competition risk from other projects, changes in framework conditions, and unavailability of 
central project components. Examples of essential components are agreements with 
authorities, permits, off-take contracts, and supply of raw materials. Other factors which can 
endanger the project are political opposition, citizen opposition, impact on the environment or 
the native population.  
2.3 Construction and operation risks  
Identification of relevant project risks is important in order to be able to determine appropriate 
risk mitigation and risk allocation. The following presents the most relevant construction and 
operation risks adapted from Finnerty (2007), Gatti (2008), Hoffman (2008), and Nevitt and 
Fabozzi (2000).  
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Completion risk 
Completion risk concern delay in construction or the project not being completed at all. 
Reasons can be force majeure events, cost overruns or technical deficiencies.  
Technological risk  
Technological risk includes both the risk of technological deficiency and technological 
obsolescence. The latter is especially relevant for industries with high technological 
development. Projects with a high risk of being technologically outdated after completion are 
unlikely to qualify for project finance. The same is the case with unproven technologies. 
According to Hoffman, unproven technologies lack predictability, and are therefore not suited 
for project finance. However, such projects may receive project finance if a creditworthy 
project participant, e.g. the contractor or technology supplier, is willing to give a technical 
performance guarantee supporting the project debt.  
Financial risk 
Financial risks include interest rate risk, currency risk, inflation risk and credit risk. Interest 
rate risk applies in projects with floating-rate debt. Such projects involve the risk of not being 
able to service debt if the risk increases above a certain level. Currency risk is present when 
the project has obligations or receivables in different currencies. If one currency depreciates 
relative to the other currency there is an imbalance, which can affect the project’s results both 
positively and negatively. Inflation represents a source of risk when cost inflation and revenue 
inflation develop differently.  
Credit risk is also known as counterparty risk. Hoffman underlines the fact that allocating 
risks to other parties is a useful risk management tool only if that party is creditworthy; “in the 
project finance equation, the project company’s lack of creditworthiness, therefore, is 
exchanged with the creditworthiness of the other project participants”7. This is why the 
lenders in project finance also investigate the financial record of contractors and suppliers, not 
only the sponsors. In projects with an off-take contract selling all or most of the production, 
the creditworthiness of this purchaser is especially important. According to Hoffman, factors 
such as industry ranking, line of business, sensitivity to price fluctuations and reputation are 
taken into consideration when evaluating the purchaser’s creditworthiness.  
                                                 
7 Hoffman (2008), p. 60 
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Political risk  
Political risk, also known as legal or regulatory risk, is the risk of the authorities in varying 
degrees interfering with the project. Examples are legal restrictions, law changes and 
increased taxes. In more extreme cases, there is a risk of expropriation or expatriation. 
Hoffman explains expropriation risk as the risk of the host country taking control over the 
project’s assets or rights, whereas expatriation is “the risk that the profits earned in 
connection with project operation cannot be removed from the host country”8. Political risk 
varies between countries, and is often more explicitly present in developing countries, but 
exists also in developed nations where increased taxes and retroactive law changes can affect 
project performance negatively. Hoffman emphasises how taxation can be used as a tool for 
governments to influence a project or an industry. Taxation entail possibilities to introduce 
new taxes, cancel or modify existing regulation, and remove favourable tax treatment. In 
projects with foreign sponsors, increased taxes can be a way of retaining the profits in the 
country (i.e. expatriation).  
Environmental risk  
Environmental risks are concerned with any negative impact the construction of the project 
can have on the surrounding environment. The government in the host country can impose 
liability on the project through environmental laws or regulations. Examples are fines and 
penalties, cleanup costs and treatment costs.    
Force majeure risk  
Force majeure is a collective term for events beyond the control of all project participants. 
These events are also called “acts of God” and include natural disasters, fire, war and strikes. 
Force majeure events may delay construction or temporarily stop operations.  
Market risk 
Market risk has a direct effect on the project’s cash flows and consists of revenue risk, 
demand risk and raw material price risk. In case of an increase in raw material cost or reduced 
revenues, the project is in danger of not generating sufficient cash flow to cover its 
obligations.  
                                                 
8 Hoffman (2008), p. 49 
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Operational risk 
Once construction is completed and operations begin, there is a risk of the project not 
performing according to predefined specifications. As with market risk, this affects the 
project’s debt service ability and cash flows available for equity holders.  
2.4 Risk mitigation  
After identifying the project risks, the next step in risk management is to implement measures 
to mitigate the risks. According to Gatti, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) has three basic 
choices when it comes to risk mitigation; the SPV can retain the risk, the SPV can transfer 
risk to another project participant, or the SPV can transfer the risk to insurance agents, whose 
main tasks are risk management. The first option applies for the risks that cannot be allocated 
to counterparties, either because it is too costly to do so, or because it is not feasible. The 
second option is managed in contracts with stakeholders in the project.  
There are also additional risk mitigation measures the sponsors can initiate. Choosing an EPC 
contractor which also can supply O&M services avoids misunderstandings and possible 
conflicts where the EPC contractor blames the O&M provider and vice versa and neither 
accepts responsibilities for deficiencies. Having a local partner, either as sponsor or another 
central stakeholder, can reduce the expropriation risk because local interests in the project 
make it less tempting for the host government to confiscate resources from the project.  
The importance of maintaining good relations with project participants, the banks and the 
authorities should not be disregarded. Although financial soundness such as creditworthiness 
is the primary concern for the lending bank, reputation and relations with the sponsor 
company also play a part in negotiations. Trust between the bank and the borrower is essential 
to receive funding. The bank must be assured that the borrower is dedicated to the project and 
intends to pay back the debt according to the loan agreement.  
Contracts  
Contracts are part of risk mitigation because they describe the responsibilities of all project 
participants and allocate the project risks to the SPV and its counterparties. The contracts give 
incentives to comply with agreements because they state the penalties for parties not meeting 
their obligations. This risk allocation ensures that the costs resulting from any incidents are 
covered by the responsible party, not the SPV or the lenders.  
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Important contracts and what risks they cover will be described in detail in the case study in 
section 5.  Central contracts are the Transfer of rights agreement, EPC contract, O&M 
contract, off-take agreement, loan agreement, permits from the authorities, and land lease or 
purchase agreement. These contracts entirely or partially cover revenue risk, technical risk, 
completion risk and operational risks. 
A special type of contract is the financial hedging contract mitigating financial risks. 
Financial risks can be hedged with derivatives contracts such as options, swaps, futures and 
forwards. The perhaps most common hedge in project finance is the interest-rate swap. The 
interest rate risk of a floating-rate loan can be hedged with a swap, which receives a floating-
rate interest and pays a fixed-rate interest. The net obligation for the SPV is fixed interest rate, 
and the risk of increases in the floating-rate is avoided. The lending bank often requires an 
interest rate swap.  
Insurance  
According to Khan and Parra, insurance policies is a credit enhancement tool in project 
financing, since it covers risks not handled by any of the project participants. The answer to 
which party is best able to handle a risk in the least costly manner is often an insurance 
company. Insurance can in some case be required by the host country, in other cases by the 
lending bank. For several of the risk sources described, there exist insurance products which 
can mitigate the particular risk. Gatti emphasises that there is a trade-off between insurance 
and risk premium paid to the lending bank. The necessity of an insurance policy should be 
evaluated against the premium charged by the bank in absence of that insurance.  
Common insurance policies according to Gatti are transport policy, third-party liability and 
accidental pollution, employers’ third party liability, all assembly risks policy, all site 
equipment risks policy, force majeure, and business interruption. A special type of insurance 
is political risk insurance. Political risk insurance is provided by bilateral or multilateral 
agencies and commercial insurance companies. Export credit agencies (ECAs) provide 
political risk coverage for SPVs based in developing countries. The coverage often includes 
currency availability, expropriation and political violence. The coverage of creeping 
expropriation, change in law risk and contract risk varies between the different ECAs.  
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2.5 Risk matrix  
After identifying the sources of risk and attempting to mitigate these through different 
measures, the agreed risk allocation between the project participants can be summarised in a 
risk matrix. A general risk matrix is presented in table 2. The matrix also contains what effect 
each risk has on project result; whether the effect can be positive, negative or both. Though it 
may seem as almost all risks are distributed away from the SPV, there are often remaining 
risks that must be borne by the project company. Even though most risk sources are 
distributed to various project participants, there is a possibility that the counterparty is unable 
to meet his obligations. The degree of recourse decides how much of the residual risk is 
allocated to the sponsors.  
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Effect on project 
results: 
Risk:  Mitigation 
mechanism: 
Allocation to: 
- Completion risk EPC contract EPC contractor 
- Technical risk Warranties, 
guarantees  
EPC contractor, 
technology supplier, 
equipment 
manufacturer 
+/- Financial risk: Interest 
rate risk 
Derivatives, e.g. 
interest rate swap 
Bank  
+/- Financial risk: Currency 
risk 
Derivatives  Bank 
+/- Financial risk:  
Inflation risk 
Derivatives Bank 
- Financial risk: 
Credit risk 
Due diligence 
examining 
creditworthiness of 
counterparties 
SPV/sponsors 
- Political risk Political risk insurance Insurance provider 
(e.g. export credit 
agency) 
- Environmental risk Insurance Insurance provider 
- Force Majeure risk Insurance  Insurance provider 
- Market risk: Revenue 
risk 
Off-take contract Purchaser  
- Market risk: Raw 
materials price risk 
Long-term supply 
contract 
Raw materials supplier 
- Operational risk O&M contract, 
guarantees  
O&M contractor, 
equipment 
manufacturer 
 
 
Table 2 Risk matrix 
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3. Renewables and photovoltaic technology 
3.1 Renewables 
Utilising renewable energy sources is not a new phenomenon; before fossil fuels were 
discovered renewables such as sunlight, wind and water were the only available sources of 
energy. I will in the following use the term “renewables” as a collective term for renewable 
energy technologies. Although it is grammatically incorrect, this terminology is commonly 
used in the industry.  
Renewables are preferred over conventional energy sources such as coal, oil and gas, because 
of their lower environmental impact. There are several factors driving a transition from fossil 
energy to renewable energy. Climate change, increased energy demand and energy security 
are central driving forces for the deployment of renewable technologies. In addition, Asplund 
(2008) points at technology improvements, demand for distributed power solutions and rising 
electricity prices as catalysts for the clean energy industry. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2009) has projected an increase in the world’s energy consumption of 
44 % from 2006 to 2030. Substituting part of this increase with renewable energy would 
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, which are part of the cause of climate change. 
Uncertainty about the remaining reserves of fossil fuels also contributes to making renewables 
the preferred future energy source, as well as both economic and physical energy security.  
 
Although a transition from conventional energy sources to renewables is needed, the strategy 
for how to achieve this is not apparent. The Economist (2009a) characterises climate change 
as the hardest political challenge the world has ever faced: “It is a prisoner’s dilemma, a free-
rider problem and the tragedy of the commons all rolled into one.” The topic is receiving 
more attention from both media and politicians than before, but it seems difficult to translate 
words into action. Scheer (2007) compares the consumption of fossil energy in a period where 
several global conferences took place. From 1990 to 2002 the consumption of renewable 
energy increased with 33 %, whereas the consumption of fossil energy resources increased 
with 44 %. Between 1995 and 2002 there were ten conferences discussing climate protection, 
which according to Scheer “have not been able to change a single thing about this 
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development; the world’s fossil energy consumption grew more rapidly than ever before”9. 
More recently, the UN climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 failed to meet the 
expectations of reaching a global agreement concerning climate change, and was described by 
The Economist (2010) as a failure.  
 
 
3.2 Solar energy and photovoltaic technology 
Today solar power provides only a marginal part of the world’s energy generation, but the 
industry has experienced high growth during the last years and has great potential. Solar 
energy can be converted into electricity utilising the photovoltaic effect (this will be explained 
further in the following 
paragraph).  Figure 3 shows the 
impressing growth in 
photovoltaic production from 
1975 to 2007
10
.  
 
According to Siegel et al (2008) 
the solar resources are enormous 
compared to fossil resources: 
“The amount of solar energy the 
Earth receives every minute is 
greater than the amount of energy from fossil fuels the world uses in a year
11”.   
 
To illustrate the potential of renewable energy, Scheer (2007) calculates the size of the area 
required if the global electricity consumption were to be generated using only photovoltaic 
technology. This area is 210,000 km
2
, equal to approximately 2 % of the USA or Europe, or 5 
% of Norway or Germany.  
                                                 
9 Scheer (2007), p. 2 
10 Earth Policy Institute (200)  
11 Siegel et al (2008), p. 27 
Figure 3 Annual photovoltaic production 
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Solar energy  
Energy from the sun can be utilised mainly in two ways; through thermal or photovoltaic 
technology. Thermal systems make use of solar energy in heat-driven mechanisms, for 
example converting water into steam, which then is used to generate electricity in a steam 
turbine. Photovoltaic (PV) systems transform sunlight directly to electricity utilising the 
photoelectric effect which was first described by Albert Einstein in 1905
12
 and later awarded 
him the Nobel Prize in physics. I will in this thesis concentrate on projects using PV 
technology.  
PV technology 
Figure 4 shows how PV technology 
makes use of sunlight. The solar panel 
is made up of several solar cells. 
Electric current is created when 
photons of sunlight strike the solar cell.  
Solar panels are in turn connected 
together in an overall system placed on 
a roof-top or mounted on the ground. 
Electricity from the modules is 
converted by a power inverter to the 
current used in the grid. Solar energy 
produces direct current (DC), which 
must be converted to alternating current (AC) by the inverter. Because PV technology utilise 
both direct and indirect irradiation, PV is not as dependent on direct sunlight as thermal solar 
systems are, and therefore applicable in greater parts of the world. Figure 5 shows the 
potential for PV electricity in Europe
13
.   
                                                 
12 Store Norske Leksikon (2009) 
13 European Commission (2006) 
Figure 4 PV technology 
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Watt-peak (Wp) or kilowatt-peak 
(kWp) is the unit of 
measurement for power 
generated by a solar module 
under standard test conditions. 
The actual generated power 
depends on weather conditions 
and module efficiency. The 
performance ratio (PR) is a 
measure of efficiency and 
reliability of a PV plant. The 
ratio is the relationship between 
actual and theoretically possible 
energy output.  
 
 
The process of producing solar power starts with extracting silicon from quartz and ends with 
producing electricity in solar systems. The PV value chain is illustrated below. The first step 
is the process of transforming silicon of about 98-99% purity into high purity silicon, so-
called polysilicon, with a purity of more than 99.9999 %. In the next step polysilicon is cast 
into ingots, which are sliced into thin wafers. The third step of the process creates solar cells 
from the wafers in a chemical process. The fourth step assembles the cells together in 
modules, and in the final step modules are connected in solar systems to produce electricity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative to using silicon is thin-film PV. This technology uses other elements in the 
production process. According to Siegel et al thin-film technology has the greatest potential of 
reducing the cost of PV since it is better suited for mass-production and avoids the expensive 
Figure 5 PV electricity potential in Europe 
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process of purifying silicon. However, thin film modules are currently less efficient and less 
suitable for system installations with area limitations, e.g. roof tops.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of PV power 
An apparent advantage to electricity generated using PV technology is its use of a renewable 
energy source and consequently low greenhouse gas emissions. The European Photovoltaic 
Industry Association (EPIA, 2010b) has identified 10 reasons for using PV electricity. Among 
these are no fuel costs, low maintenance required, no emissions and safe and reliable systems. 
According to 
Asplund “the 
energy from the sun 
that hits the earth 
every day is 
sufficient to meet 
the energy needs of 
the earth’s 6.6 
billion inhabitants 
for 27 years
14”. 
Availability of 
resources is 
therefore not an 
issue. This gives PV a competitive advantage over other technologies when it comes to both 
securing energy supply and meeting increasing energy demand. These are both concerns to 
many governments. The availability of silicon is neither a problem, as this is the world’s 
second most abundant element after oxygen in the earth’s crust. Since this element is non-
toxic, PV is one of the least polluting technologies when it comes to greenhouse gas 
emissions. A comparison with other electricity generation technologies is presented in figure 
6
15
. Both polysilicon technology and thin-film have low green house gas emissions, only wind 
pollutes less.  
                                                 
14 Asplund (2008), p. 75  
15 EPIA (2010b) 
Figure 6 GHG emissions 
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An advantage regarding R&D activity is that the silicon wafers used in PV are the same as the 
ones used in the semiconductor industry. A common knowledge base can be advantageous for 
both industries. An obvious drawback of PV is that it only generates electricity during the 
day. Another disadvantage of PV is that it still is expensive compared to conventional energy 
sources and depends on subsidies from governments.   
 
3.3 Grid parity  
A challenge for any power generating technology is to be competitive with other technologies 
and reach grid parity. Grid parity is the break-even cost defined as “the point where the cost 
of PV-generated electricity equals the cost of electricity purchased from the grid”16. For solar 
this goal has not yet been reached, except for in some markets where conditions are especially 
favourable. Additional efficiency gains, technological progress and cost reductions are needed 
for further development. The historical improvement in this area is impressing. From having a 
conversion efficiency of 5 % in the 1950s, modern cells have improved to 12 to 18 % 
efficiency. Whereas the cost of PV capacity was approximately 300 USD per watt in 1956, 
the cost in 2009 was 5 USD per watt
17
. This reduction is partially due to economies of scale, 
and partially to experience curve effects. Calculations done by Bradford (2006) suggest a 
learning rate of 18 percent from 1980 to 2003 for grid-connected PV modules. This means the 
unit cost has dropped 18 percent for every doubling of installed capacity. The cost reduction 
causes the price gap between PV power and power generated by fossil fuels to decrease, and 
in turn brings the price of PV electricity closer to grid parity.    
 
A study on grid parity conducted by NREL (Denholm, 2009) found that the key drivers are 
not technical factors such as solar resource, but cost of electricity, rate structure and financing 
availability. Since incentive systems and electricity prices vary over time and geographical 
areas, break-even is reached in different markets at different times. The study shows that 
break-even was reached or almost reached in 2008 in some US states. In California grid parity 
                                                 
16 Denholm et al (2009) 
17 EIA (2009) 
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was reached due to good solar resources, while drivers of grid parity in New York State and 
Massachusetts were high electricity prices combined with incentives.  
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4. Financing photovoltaic projects 
4.1 Project finance and photovoltaic projects 
I will in this part of the thesis present data on project finance loans in the PV industry. Section 
4.1.1 summarises selected project financed PV deals announced since 2009. Section 4.1.2 
looks into the details of the project financed Montalto di Castro PV project, which was 
awarded Deal of the Year by Euromoney in 2009, while section 4.1.3 analyses a sample of 
actual term sheets.  
4.1.1 Project financed photovoltaic parks 
In order to take a closer look at current project financing, I have examined news from the PV 
industry mainly published in Project Finance International and Project Finance Magazine 
from January 2009 until April 2010, limited to projects in Germany, Italy, France and the 
Czech Republic. These countries are chosen for various reasons; Germany is the largest PV 
market in the world, the other countries are emerging markets at different stages. According 
to New Energy Finance (2010) the capacity installed in Germany in December 2009 alone, is 
greater than installed capacity in any other country for the whole year. Solarbuzz (2010) 
reports Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic as the top three countries in PV in 2009. The 
results of this analysis are presented in appendix 2.  
The review shows that the Puglia region in Italy is centre for a great deal of the PV plants in 
Europe. The size of the projects ranges from 1 to 100 MW; the total size of all deals in the 
period is approximately 600 MW. (A cautionary note should be made here; the numbers are 
intended only as an illustration, not statistics.) One of the large PV plants project financed in 
Germany is the Lieberose project. With a size of 53 MW this is predicted to be Germany’s 
largest and the world’s second largest PV plant of its kind, according to Project Finance 
Magazine (2009b). Some of the largest projects are portfolios of parks. The value of the 
projects varies from below 10 up to 200m EUR. The sponsors of the PV projects are mostly 
solar developers working with building, financing, owning and operating solar parks. 
Examples of companies acting as sponsors for several of the deals in the selection are SAG 
Solarstrom AG, Fotowatio, and EDF Energies Nouvelles. Central banks are Centrobanca, 
Santander, UniCredit, Commerzbank, and Deutsche Bank. In addition, some of the projects 
have governmental support such as the Cellino San Marco PV project where SACE, the 
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Italian export credit agency, covers part of the debt. Another example of government support 
is the 500 million EUR loan the European Investment Bank (EIB) has granted EDF Energies 
Nouvelles for PV projects in France and Italy. The loan from EIB will constitute half of the 
debt needed for the projects, whereas commercial banks will contribute with the other half.   
 
The tenor of the loans is typically around 17-19 years, reflecting the fact that feed-in-tariff 
agreements often last 20 years, and the banks wishes to ensure that the loan is repaid before 
the FIT period ends. Besides maturity and an estimated loan amount, not many details about 
the loans are being disclosed. A common feature of the lending, however, is high leverage. Of 
the loans disclosing information about loan amount and total investment, the highest debt 
level is 86.3 % whereas the lowest is 62.6 %.  
Cellino San Marco PV project 
One of the most costly investments in the sample, is the Cellino San Marco PV project in 
Italy, initiated by the sponsors AES and Riverstone. According to Project Finance Magazine 
(2010a) the 43 MW project is estimated to cost 200m EUR, where 172.25m is project debt, 
the rest equity. The debt is provided by five banks; SC, UniCredit, BNP Paribas, Credit 
Agricole, and Dexia Crediop. The banks have different areas of responsibility; SG handles 
documentation, modelling and hedging, whereas BNP Paribas deals with insurance. The 
172.25m loan consists of a 92.5m construction facility, 60.8m term loan, 3.18m standby 
facility and 15.7m VAT facility. The tenor of all facilities is 18 years, except for the 5 year 
VAT loan. This deal illustrates the time-consuming process of structuring project finance, as 
it took the participants around one year to finalise the deal. Two main concerns in the lengthy 
process were risk concerned with feed-in-tariffs and risk regarding the thin film solar panels. 
The material risk was reduced with a 10 year availability guarantee provided by the PV 
supplier, First Solar.  
 
The tariff risk involved uncertainty about what tariff the project would be granted. In case the 
plant is completed in 2010 as scheduled, there is no risk concerning the tariff amount. If, 
however, there is a delay, the tariff in 2011 is unknown. Since the risk of delay is highly 
present, this represented a major concern for the project participants. The risk was mitigated 
through a covenant forcing the sponsors to inject sufficient equity to compensate for the lost 
FIT revenues, in the event the actual tariff was lower than the 2010 level. Project Finance 
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Magazine predicts that this structure will be copied in other projects, since there is uncertainty 
about the Italian tariffs. This structure emphasises the importance of the sponsors’  
creditworthiness. Part of the reason why the risk of delay was present in this project is that the 
process of receiving the necessary permits from the Italian authorities tends to be quite time-
consuming. Head of project finance in Italy at Calyon (Crédit Agricole's corporate and 
investment banking entity) has stated: "The development costs are quite high in Italy because 
the lead time to get authorisations is quite long ... the lower costs of the plant (materials) may 
be partially offset by the development costs"
18
. Project Finance Magazine (2009d) discusses 
how time spent on dealing with authorities can affect an otherwise attractive market. The 
Greek PV market may look promising as a potential growth area, but the fact that some 
developers wait 18 months or more to get the required permits makes Greece less interesting 
to PV developers. In contrast, the authorisation period in Germany may take only two or three 
months.  
4.1.2 Montalto di Castro PV project 
The project financing of a 24 MW solar park in Lazio, Italy, was awarded the Euromoney 
Deal of the Year in 2009. The sponsor, SunRay, managed to receive financing for the so far 
biggest PV project in Italy even though SunRay is rather new in the solar development 
business, and banks were hesitant to lend as they were still recovering from the financial 
crisis. A third complicating factor was the already mentioned lengthy Italian permitting 
process. SunRay managed to overcome these obstacles and the process of financing the 
Montalto di Castro PV project has been a great success. Key information on the deal is 
presented in table 3. The plant generates electricity which is sold to an Italian grid operator. 
According to the Italian feed-in-tariff regulation the SPV receives a tariff plus the electricity 
price for the delivered output. The project also has the rights to negotiate power purchase 
agreements with end users. The lifetime of the plant is initially 20 years, equal to the Italian 
tariff period. SunPower, an American company operating in different areas across the PV 
value chain, is the EPC contractor, and also provides O&M services to the project. The EPC 
contract and permits from regional authorities are central contracts in the project.      
                                                 
18 PROJECTFINANCEMAGAZINE 2009b. Solar flares. Project Finance Magazine, Iss. 305, 42-43. 
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Project Finance Magazine (2009c, 2010c) 
points at several factors contributing to 
making this deal a success. Head of 
project finance at SunRay has stated that 
the company had a strong focus on 
conducting a thorough project finance 
process:  
“Banks were impressed by the extent of 
our own due diligence across all aspects, 
particularly on the project contracts and 
legal issues. […] We returned to old-
fashioned project finance values – for 
instance, we issued a detailed information 
memorandum to banks, something that 
hasn’t been done in the market for about 
five years!”19  
Part of what convinced the banks, were an 
extensive legal due diligence and the 
guarantees provided by the EPC 
contractor. The legal due diligence 
reduced risk by clarifying regulatory 
issues with the regional authorities. This 
careful treatment of legal aspects 
combined with the fact that the sponsor 
owns the land for the plant contributes to 
ensuring that potential future conflicts are 
avoided. The EPC contractor, SunPower provides several guarantees, and has a strong credit 
rating compared to its competitors, many of which having problems with excess capacity. 
This ensures the bank that the project will not fail due to problems with the contractor. 
                                                 
19 Project Finance Magazine (2009c) 
Montalto di Castro PV 
Project company  Cassiopea PV S.r.l 
Sponsor SunRay 
Mandated lead 
arrangers 
Banca Infrastture 
Innovazione e Sviluppo, 
Société Genérále, 
WestLB AG 
EPC contractor and 
O&M contractor 
SunPower 
Capacity 24 MW 
Total investment 145m Eur 
Loan facility 120m Eur 
Debt level 80-85 % 
Margin Approx. 275-300 bps 
Tenor loan agreement 19 yrs, cash sweep at 
year 8 
Source: Project Finance Magazine 
(2009c,2010c)  
 
Table 3 Montalto di Castro PV 
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Another feature of the deal is the participation of SACE, the Italian export credit agency. 
SACE guarantees 80 % of the debt provided by Société Genérále.  
Project Finance Magazine emphasises the importance of SunRay convincing the lenders of 
their long-term commitment to the project, especially since SunRay is a new developer. 
SunRay did this by actively taking part in construction and operations, and demonstrated a 
long horizon through plans of extending the plant up to 100 MW. These plans are still on an 
early stage, but such an enlargement would make it the world’s largest PV plant, surpassing 
the 60 MW Spanish plant in Olmedilla which currently is the largest. Project Finance 
Magazine also points at the community-based development model SunRay employs as a 
success factor for this deal. One of the tasks of the 35 people team in Italy is to maintain the 
relationship with local stakeholders.  
The project demonstrate typical features of project finance as the it makes use of proven 
technology and uses equity in the construction period before drawing on the debt. Investing 
own funds before borrowed is another sign of commitment.  
Whereas the Cellino San Marco project struggled with tariff uncertainty, this was not an issue 
in the Montalto project. The tariff drop of 2 % in 2010 was already known in 2009 when the 
financing of the Montalto project was being negotiated. The EPC contract with SunPower 
also contained a special compensation package if the plant would not be completed and grid-
connected in 2009.  
The Montalto di Castro project demonstrates successful project finance with its thorough 
planning process and high focus on providing detailed information to the bank. From the 
banks’ perspective, the long-term commitment of the sponsor and the choice of a solid EPC 
contractor are positive signals of the viability of the project. The project is predicted to be a 
template for future ventures because of its structure.  
4.1.3 Review of term sheets 
A review of 8 confidential term sheets reveal typical characteristics of loans available for PV 
projects and their inherent covenants and restrictions. Table 4 presents a summary of common 
terms and range.  
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The leverage found in this sample is consistent with the theory predicting high debt levels, in 
these examples 70-86 % of the capital structure is debt. The sizes of the loans are from 2.8m-
34m Eur.   
Term Range 
Leverage 70/30 – 86/14 
Loan size 2.8m – 34m Eur  
Maturity 12-20 yrs 
Interest rate EURIBOR plus margin 
Margin 170-325 bps 
Up-front fee 175-250 bps 
Commitment fee 40-50 % of margin p.a. 
Minimum Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio 
1.05-1.30x 
Debt Service Reserve Account Next 6 months debt service  
Governing law Local or English 
Table 4 Summary term sheet 
Maturity varies between 12 and 20 years. Most of the loans have a tenor of 17 or 18 years. 
This is because FIT agreements usually last 20 years, and the bank wishes to ensure that the 
loan is repaid before the end of the guaranteed stream of revenues.   
The interest rate is made up from EURIBOR (Euro interbank offered rate) plus the applicable 
margin. The margin on the loan varies in this sample from 170 to 325 bps. The margin is 
typically higher at the end of the tenor. One of the sample loans illustrate this: The margin is 
275 bps during construction, during the first seven years of operation the margin is 275 bps, it 
then increases to 300 bps from year 8 and increases again to 325 bps after year 14.   
The fee structure of the loans include a one-time up-front fee and an annual commitment fee, 
possibly also a fixed administrative fee. The up-front fee is typically 2.50 % of the loan 
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facility whereas the commitment fee is priced at around 50 % of the margin on the interest 
rate, payable on any undrawn amount. The law governing the transaction is either English law 
or local law in the country where the project is located.  
The banks demand a minimum level of the Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) of 1.05 to 1.30. 
This requirement means that the projects at all times must have sufficient cash available to 
meet the debt service requirement plus an additional 5 to 30 %.  A diminishing DSCR is 
considered an early warning sign. The DSCR minimum requirement illustrates the banks’ 
proactive approach. A diminishing DSCR triggers reactions from the bank. Rather than acting 
when payments are missing, the bank will initiate measures when the debt service ability is 
deteriorating. Because of the limited recourse or non-recourse feature it is essential to the 
banks to recover their receivables while there still are funds in the project. 
Reserve accounts described in the term sheets are Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA) and 
Maintenance Reserve account (MRA). The standard requirement is that the DSRA contains 
sufficient funds to cover the next 6 months debt service.   
In addition to the term loan, the loan agreement often also includes a VAT facility intended 
for VAT expenses accruing during construction. The VAT loan comes with a separate set of 
terms, similar to those for the loan. These terms typically involve a shorter maturity and 
somewhat smaller fees.  
The term sheet lays out a so-called “cash flow waterfall” stating how the cash flows from the 
project are to be prioritised among the project participants. Operating expenses and taxes are 
the first priority, followed by interests, hedging costs, and principal payment. Then reserve 
accounts, possible cash sweep, voluntary prepayment of senior debt, and lastly, distribution to 
shareholders.  
The term sheet contains a plan for repayment. The repayment schedule is either linearly, 
annuity-based, or sculpted. 4 of the 8 term sheets involve sculpting based on a certain DSCR, 
for example 1.3 or 1.45. Sculpting involve adjusting the annual repayments according to the 
size of the cash flows available for debt service based on the DSCR determined by the bank. 
Some of the term sheets include a cash sweep mechanism that gives the bank access to 
available funds for early debt repayment given certain conditions. Three of the term sheets 
included a cash sweep at year 6 or year 8. Nevitt and Fabozzi (2000) explain how a cash 
 56 
sweep works; in their example, a project is financed with a 30-year loan. In case the deal is 
not refinanced before the end of year 6, a cash sweep mechanism will force all surplus cash 
flows to be used for loan prepayment. Consequently, the maturity is then expected to be 
reduced from 30 years to 12 years. The motivation behind the use of this cash sweep is to 
encourage refinancing since the project once completed, involves different risks compared to 
when the project financing was agreed. The new risks are expected to be attractive to other 
kinds of investors such as the capital market and bond investors especially, making the project 
eligible for refinancing.   
One side of the loan financing is the hedging contract. The bank providing the loan will also 
in many cases require a hedging contract, often in the form of an interest swap contract. Two 
of the term sheets demand that at least 75 % of the loan amount must be hedged in an interest 
rate swap. The arranging bank will often provide the hedge contract; one of the term sheets 
even reserves the right to do so.  
Another central part of the term sheet, seen from the bank’s perspective, is security. Most 
term sheets describe what the bank is entitled to as security for their funds. These lists include 
pledge on equipment, receivables from sales of electricity, reserve accounts (DSRA and 
MRA), all shares in the borrower as well as a cross guarantee between sponsors ensuring that 
the bank will be repaid, even if one of the sponsors cannot meet his obligations. The term 
sheets also state provisions for voluntary and mandatory prepayment. Voluntary prepayment 
is typically dependent upon certain conditions and trigger unwinding costs to end the interest 
rate swap contract. Mandatory prepayment is required in case of insurance payments, event of 
refinancing, or liquidation of the project company.  
In order to evaluate the project, the banks hire own experts on technical aspects, yield, legal 
issues, and taxes and accounting to evaluate the project. In some cases the bank will accept 
using the same advisors as the project to avoid duplication of effort. This additional due 
diligence is beneficial for the project, but must of course be paid for. All costs and expenses, 
including legal fees and advisors’ remuneration, are borne by the borrower.  
The term sheets all specify certain restrictions on the purpose of the loan and shareholders’ 
actions. Covenants concern both the sponsors’ undertakings and the borrower’s undertakings. 
The sponsors will often have to maintain their ownership share and are not allowed to 
abandon the project. A possible change in ownership must be approved by the lenders. The 
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borrower (i.e. the SPV) on the other hand, must provide the bank regular progress reports 
during construction and later financial information, including calculations of cover ratios. The 
borrower must continue the insurances required by the lenders, perform maintenance as 
agreed and comply with permits and authorisations. The borrower is obligated to notify the 
bank in the event of default, delays or insurance claims. Moreover, the borrower has 
restrictions or is even prohibited against further indebtedness. There are also limitations on 
transactions with affiliates, such as the sponsors, investments and dividend disbursement. A 
typical covenant is the “no change in business”-requirement, preventing asset substitution 
from taking place. In case of a change in plan that requires additional investments, this must 
be financed by the sponsors through equity or a subordinated loan.  
The term sheet typically contains a list of “Conditions Precedents”, or CPs, which are 
prerequisites the project company must fulfil before drawdown of the loan can begin. 
Common CPs are presenting final reports from legal, technical and insurance advisors, the 
financial model, evidence that the sponsors have provided promised equity to the project 
company, evidence of payment of fees and other costs and expenses. Further, CPs require 
presentation of relevant documentation such as building permits, certificates, insurance 
policy, hedging strategy, yield assessment, the contract with the grid operator and the land 
lease contract. Before drawdown, the Debt Service Reserve Account must be fully funded, 
and the required insurances must in effect.  
The term sheets illustrate the power of the banks in project finance. The banks control and 
monitor all aspects of the project through numerous restrictions and covenants. Securing the 
banks’ interests is always the first priority, which is natural since the bank operates in a 
downside business. The banks are exposed to downside risk, but have no upside potential. The 
banks secure their interests in four provisions. First, sculpting is often used to determine 
annual debt service. Second, the bank demands a debt service reserve account, typically with 
funds to cover the next six months debt service. The third mechanism is the list of securities 
in the term sheet, where the bank gets access to the SPVs equipment, reserve accounts, 
receivables from electricity sale, possible recourse to the sponsor and cross guarantee with the 
sponsors’ other projects. Last, there is a fourth mechanism protecting the banks interests. The 
relationship between the bank and the sponsors is central, even though “hard facts” such as 
asset value and future cash flows is most important. The bank must be sure that the sponsors 
can be trusted and that the sponsor will not sell their share to a less credible company after the 
loan agreement is signed. The maturity of the loans also underlines the banks’ wish to secure 
 58 
repayment, as the tenor of the loan is shorter than that of the fixed revenues (i.e. feed-in-
tariffs). In some term sheets, there is even a cash sweep clause further shortening the maturity.  
The term sheets also demonstrate how the bank charges for all services. In addition to the 
margin on the loan, the bank charges an upfront fee, a commitment fee, possibly other fees, a 
margin on the hedge contract and all expenses the bank has with due diligence.   
Further, the term sheets illustrate how the banks are key participants in the projects. Their role 
is not to passively lend out money, but actively taking part in the process. The different 
covenants and provisions put in place by the banks apply in different situations, at different 
stages of the project and are intended to cover several types of risks. Most of the terms are 
aimed at protecting the banks’ interests before the project performance deteriorates, whereas a 
few apply in events of default. In situations where profits for various reasons start falling, the 
diminishing debt service coverage ratio will alert the banks of the decline. If unexpected 
expenses arise, the reserve accounts may be utilised to cover the costs, and hence not affect 
the debt service ability in that year. In some projects equity holders may suspect that the 
project will run into difficulties later and wish to distribute dividends as soon as possible. The 
cash flow waterfall and other requirements for dividend disbursement will in such situations 
prevent distributions to the equity holders before all other claims are paid. Other projects may 
experience great variation in profits from one year to the other. Here, the sculpting technique 
for repayment can secure that the banks receive interest and instalments also in the years with 
lower profits. In addition, sculpting reduces the free cash flows in the years with higher 
profits. Another scenario involves projects receiving an insurance indemnity. The cause of the 
insurance claim might have led to losses and might indicate uncertainty regarding future 
performance of the equipment. The bank is protected from any impact of these uncertainties 
through the mandatory prepayment covenant giving the bank the right to the indemnity.  
The term sheets are an illustration of why the expression “the devil is the detail” is sometimes 
used about project finance. The term sheets contain detailed cash flow waterfalls, 
requirements for shareholder distributions, restrictions on the sponsors’ actions, and purpose 
of the loan. The latter is aimed at preventing asset substitution from taking place in the 
projects, since the term sheet clearly describes the project and how the loan amount is to be 
spent.   
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4.2 Government subsidies and feed-in-tariffs 
Subsidies from governments have been crucial in the development of the PV industry. For 
new industries, government support is often necessary to promote growth. The PV sector has 
experienced growth during the last years, but is not yet competitive with fossil energy and 
investments in PV still depend on subsidies from governments in order to be profitable.  
 
These subsidies arrangements come in different forms, examples are feed-in-tariffs (FIT), tax 
credits, investment funds, reduced VAT and renewable portfolio standards. Feed-in-tariffs 
provide an explicit monetary amount per MWh the plant feeds into the grid, capital subsidies 
eases the high up-front investment, while tax credits allow for a reduction in taxable profits. 
Another supporting arrangement is renewable portfolio standards requiring that a certain 
proportion of electricity sold by a utility company must be from renewable technologies. Such 
standard can also have specifications of what proportion must come from PV in particular. 
Even though there are several instruments governments can make use of in order to increase 
clean energy production and PV, feed-in-tariffs has proven to be the most efficient.  
 
Table 5 present the support arrangements for PV in various European countries. Feed-in-
tariffs, tax credits and investment subsidies are the most common support mechanisms. Five 
countries offer beneficial credit terms, often in the form of so-called “green loans” with 
reduced interest rates and grace periods. Net metering is employed in Belgium, Italy and 
Portugal. This entitles the system owner to a certain credit according to how much green 
electricity is fed into the grid. 
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metering 
Tax credits Green 
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Investment 
subsidies 
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Spain 
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UK 
 
       
Source:  EPIA(2010a) 
 
 
Table 5 Government support arrangements 
 
Feed-in-tariffs (FIT) 
Mendonça and Jacobs (2009) explain the principles of feed-in-tariffs:  
“Such schemes pay renewable energy producers a set rate (tariff) for each unit of electricity 
fed into the grid, and generally oblige power companies to purchase all electricity from 
eligible producers in their service area over a long period of time -- usually 15 to 20 years”. 
Mendonça and Jacobs seek to explain why feed-in-tariffs have become a popular support 
scheme in many countries. They find that “feed-in tariffs are empirically proven to promote 
the fastest expansion of renewable electric power, at the lowest cost”. The grounds for this, 
according to their article, is that FITs are more simple, transparent, democratic, performance-
based, cost-efficient and quickly deployed than other alternatives for subsidising renewable 
technologies. FITs can be self-financed through dividing the cost between the consumers of 
electricity, leaving the government with no cost. The cost of the FIT arrangement is often paid 
by electric utility customers as part of their electrical bill. An advantage over other support 
schemes is the possibility of making the FITs technology specific. With specific support, grid 
parity for each technology is easier to reach. 
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Feed-in-tariffs in Germany 
Mendonça and Jacobs illustrate their opinion on the effective nature of FIT using Germany as 
a case; FITs introduced by the German authorities contributed to the increase in production of 
power generated by renewables of more than 200 % from 2000 to 2008. Germany is often 
referred to because of its success with PV. Germany is the world leader on PV, however, this 
is not obvious given the German solar resources. According to Leder (2010) Germany has less 
solar radiation than 49 of the U.S.’ states. The introduction of government arrangements 
supporting the PV industry financially combined with increased support for the Green Party, 
high oil prices and Germany’s high dependence on energy import, made Germany a market 
leader on PV. In 1998, only 2 % of the country’s electricity need was covered with renewable 
energy, in 2007 this number had increased to 14.2 %. The growth in the PV industry also 
affected the job market. In 2004 there were 160,500 jobs is Germany related to renewable 
energy, in 2007 there were 249,300 such jobs and the government predicts this number to 
grow to 400,000 by 2020. The exact effect of the FITs is difficult to quantify, but Milford 
(2007) estimates that annual installations in Germany would be 10 MW without feed-in-tariff, 
compared to the current level of 750 MW.  
 
The German Renewable Energy Sources Act, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG, 2009) 
gives electricity generated from renewable technologies priority connection to the grid and 
instructs grid operators to pay a defined tariff to the producers for generated electricity. The 
tariffs for solar are fixed for 20 years. The act from 2008 determines the tariffs for plants 
being installed until January 2010. Tariffs after this are subject to reduction, given by an 
annual degression rate. The degression rates also depend on a so-called “growth corridor”. If 
the growth in installations is higher than a certain amount determined by the Federal Network 
Agency, the degression rate is increased by 1 percentage point. Accordingly, the rate is 
decreased by 1 percentage point if the growth is lower. The “growth corridor” is a way of 
regulating degression in correlation with market growth. The reduction in the tariffs only 
affects new installations. According to Mendonça and Jacobs tariff degression gives an 
incentive for technology development and cost reduction. They argue that the degression rates 
should reflect the learning potential of the technology and suggest that wind power, which is a 
more mature technology, has no or only a very low rate, while a 10 % degression rate is 
suitable for solar. This corresponds with the degression rates in Germany; wind power (excl. 
offshore wind) is subject to a 1 % degression and PV 10 % in 2010.  
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The EEG contains rules for equalisation among grid operators. The operators are required to 
record and report how much electricity they purchase from PV parks. An average share of 
electricity generated from PV is calculated. The grid operators who have purchased a higher 
share of PV power than the average is entitled to sell electricity to the operators who have 
purchased a lower share. Eventually, all grid operators will have purchased the average share.  
Feed-in-tariffs in Europe 
Table 6 compare FITs available for PV projects in 5 European countries. The FIT 
arrangements differ when it comes to the tariff amounts, and also regarding terms. Lower 
duration and no inflation indexation, which is the case in Italy and Germany; impact a 
project’s financial situation negatively. Project Finance Magazine (2009e) argues that 
inflation indexation increases the debt capacity of a project, and point at the significance of 
inflation swaps for hedging purposes. In Spain such swaps turned out to be crucial as the 
inflation in most of 2009 was negative. The same article discusses an increasing importance 
of government risk. Flaws in the design of the FIT structures may lead to uncertainty 
regarding whether the countries can afford the subsidies. An example of this is Spain and Italy 
where the expiration date for qualifying for feed-in-tariffs is not fixed, but depends on the 
total capacity installed within a period. After a certain capacity is built, new projects can no 
longer qualify for FITs. As a result of this, solar developers race against their competitors to 
finalise their project. According to Project Finance Magazine, there are severe consequences 
for the projects that do not qualify for FIT, as they are not profitable given the current market 
prices on electricity. In all, the FIT arrangements represent a great risk to solar developing 
companies and are crucial to get project financing.  
 
Table 6 include Standard & Poor’s (S&P) country rating in 2009 illustrating differences 
between the countries. The article in Project Finance Magazine finds it less likely that the 
countries in question will fail to meet their obligations, but in attempts to save money, they 
may search for reasons to disqualify projects from receiving tariffs. This was seen in Spain 
where The National Energy Commission initiated an audit investigating projects that had been 
granted feed-in-tariffs before October 2008. The recent downgrading of Greece, from A in 
2009, down to BB (often referred to as “junk”) in April 2010, reflects poor conditions for 
investors.  
 
 
 63 
2009 Solar Photovoltaic Feed-in-Tariffs 
Country S&P Country Rating  
(long term) 
Tariff 2009 (Grid connected > 
1MWp) 
Spain – 25 yrs, inflation-
indexed 
April 2010: AA
20
 Eu302 
Italy – 20 yrs, no inflation A+ Eu353 + electricity price (~Eu80) 
France – 20 yrs, inflation linked AAA Eu300 
Greece – 20 yrs, 25 % CPI 
indexed 
April 2010: BB+
21
 Eu304-Eu453 
Germany – 20 yrs, no inflation AAA Eu319 
Adapted from: Project Finance Magazine (2009e), Dagens Næringsliv (2010a) 
Table 6 Solar PV Feed-in-tariffs 
 
Criticism of feed-in-tariffs  
Despite the apparent success of the FIT arrangements, FITs have been criticised for being 
unsuccessful when it comes to making renewable energy cost-efficient. An article in The 
Economist (2009b) discussing policies quote the director of carbon markets at New Energy 
Finance on wind and solar promoting policies: “These policies are not particularly efficient, 
but they have been quite effective”. The article points at the consequences after Spain reduced 
their feed-in-tariffs in 2008. The Spanish tariffs were established in 2007 at Eu459 per MWh. 
When it was decided to reduce this to Eu320 from the end of 2008, almost 30 % reduction, 
solar developers raced to build their projects before 29 September 2008
22
. The result was a 
market collapse, The Economist reports price falls of 30-40 % and 50-75 % drop in the share 
price of many solar companies. The Economist criticise the subsidy system for creating 
                                                 
20 Dagens Næringsliv (2010b) 
21 Dagens Næringsliv (2010a)  
22 Project Finance Magazine (2009e) 
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subsidy cycles where recessions and booms follow each other in the market according to 
changes in tariffs.  
A report on economic impacts of subsidies in Germany prepared by Frondel et al (2010) is 
sceptical to whether the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) really is cost-
efficient, since the cost is borne by private and industrial consumers through increased 
electricity prices. They criticise the fact that PV counting for a smaller part of the electricity 
production receive the highest support per kWh. According to their article, PV received 24.6 
% of the total feed-in-tariffs in Germany and contributed with 6.2 % of the renewable energy 
production. They compare the beneficial situation of PV with hydro power. Hydro power 
accounted for 7 % of renewable energy production while receiving 4.2 % of the FITs. Further, 
they emphasise that the increased electricity prices for the consumers it not a short-term 
consequence, but will have a long-lasting effect since the FIT period in Germany is 20 years. 
This means that even if the arrangement is ended in 2011, the tariffs will be paid until 2031 to 
the projects that have been granted FITs. They refer to a study done by Traber and Kemfert 
(2009) finding that the consumer price of electricity is increased by 3 % due to the EEG. 
According to Frondel et al, the impact of the EEG on European emissions is negligible 
compared to this price increase. Their assertion, however, is based on the fact that reduced 
CO2 emissions in Germany affects the need for reducing emissions in other countries in the 
ETS (European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System) regime where Germany is 
a member. Frondel et al state in their article that the CO2 emissions in Germany is in fact 
substantially reduced, but “the emissions are hardly altered at the European scale by 
Germany’s EEG. This is due to the fact that Germany’s electricity production from renewable 
technologies mitigates the need for emission reductions in other countries that participate in 
the ETS regime, thereby significantly lowering CO2 certificate prices by 15 % relative to the 
situation without EEG”.  
Though there may be some truth to what the critics claim, their arguments are aimed at how 
the subsidy systems are designed, not the systems themselves. The negative consequences of 
the Spanish reduction in tariffs have been a lesson to many other countries now considering 
reducing their FITs. The arguments from Frondel et al suggest there are challenges within the 
ETS regulation, not the German EEG. Their opinion is that the German EEG is unsuccessful 
because the effect on European emissions is negligible, even though there has been a 
reduction in German emissions. They may be right in their scepticism towards the effect on 
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emissions at the European level, but the influence on certificate prices in ETS is a different 
issue, not a negative aspect of the EEG, which needs to be solved separately.  
Feed-in-tariff phase-out  
The PV industry in several countries is now growing and becoming more competitive. This 
has led many governments to reduce the FITs. As already mentioned, Spain reduced the 
tariffs from 2008 to 2009. The negative impacts of this reduction have made other countries 
implement a more gradual phase-out of the subsidies. In Germany FIT cuts have been 
anticipated for some time, but the present suggested cuts are lower than first expected. 
According to New Energy Matters (2010) a draft from the German Bundesrat suggests 16 % 
reduction in the support to rooftop projects (i.e. installations placed on roof tops), 11 % 
reduction for brownfield  sites (i.e. previously industrial sites) and no supports for PV projects 
located on farmland. To compensate the PV industry of the reduction in FIT, the German 
government proposes a EUR 100m R&D subsidy.  
The suggested changes to the French FITs signal a more specialised support scheme. 
According to Project Finance Magazine (2009a) the suggestions include higher tariffs for 
categories with low growth, while rooftop systems that now experience high demand will 
receive no support. The changes also entail measures intended to streamline the process of 
qualifying for FITs in order to encourage growth. Another interesting suggestion is tariffs 
differentiated by solar resource intensity. This means PV plants in cloudy regions will receive 
higher tariffs than plants in sunnier regions. This differentiation has been employed in wind 
energy tariffs in France and Germany since 2000, but never in solar energy.  
4.3 Financial crisis  
Investments in clean energy have experienced tremendous growth the last years; annual 
growth rates from 2004 to 2007 have been as high as 76 %, but in 2008 investments in this 
sector faced a 4 % decline compared to the previous year
23
. The financial crisis and following 
credit crunch affected investments in renewable energy severely. Credit tightening reduced 
the availability of debt, and hence reduced project financed investments especially since they 
have high leverage. According to The Economist (2009c) investments in renewables were 
                                                 
23 Liebreich et al (2010) 
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particularly negatively affected by the financial crisis because of the characteristics of 
renewable investments. They typically have low operating costs, but high investment costs, as 
the case of PV. The Economist point out the fact that some of the banks that were affected 
badly by the financial crisis such as Royal Bank of Scotland, Lehman Brothers, Washington 
Mutual and Fortis, were also among the biggest contributors in clean-energy finance.  
Reduced debt availability means higher competition for funding and stricter conditions from 
the banks. Less risky projects will be prioritised, and debt levels are expected to decrease. 
Project Finance Magazine (2009e) has predicted that the capital market will make an effort to 
distinguish between good and bad projects, forcing developers to care more about details.  
Recent financial turmoil in the Euro area, feed-in-tariff reductions and rumours of subsidy 
cuts in Spain with retroactive effect have lead to decline in share prices in the solar industry. 
While these conditions affect the owners of the solar parks negatively, they also influence the 
banks’ willingness to finance future PV projects.  
 
4.4 Summary 
The empirical data presented here on how PV projects are being financed, is in accordance 
with much of the theory on project finance. Recent project financed PV plants demonstrate 
high leverage, ranging from 62 % to 86 % debt level. An example of how a project finance 
process can be time consuming is the Cellino San Marco project where it took the participants 
around one year to finalise the loan deal. This project also illustrates how risk management is 
an important feature of project finance. Mitigation FIT risk was crucial in the process, and led 
to a financing structure that included a special clause forcing the sponsors to contribute with 
more equity in event the FIT revenues would be reduced.  
The Montalto di castro PV project was awarded Deal of the Year 2009 by Euromoney and is 
predicted to be a template for the structuring of future PV projects. This project is an example 
of how the project involves many participants. Sponsors, contractors, suppliers, authorities 
and banks all affect the financing of the project. The Montalto project illustrates the 
importance of conduction a thorough process in order to receive project financing.  
The central role of the banks in project finance is apparent from the review of term sheets. 
The term sheets all focus on protecting the banks’ interests. The banks introduce several 
 67 
measures intended to reduce the banks’ share of project risk both before the project is initiated 
and during the loan period. Before a loan is granted, the bank conducts its own due diligence 
investigating legal, financial and technical aspects of the project. The indicative term sheet 
and the final loan agreement specify the purpose of the loan and the cash flow waterfall. Both 
measures limit managerial discretion and reduce the possibility of asset substitution. After the 
loan is drawn, the bank monitors the project closely. A diminishing Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio rather than non-payment of debt service is a warning sign to the banks that causes 
measures to be effectuated. There are also mechanisms aimed at reducing the maturity of the 
loan; cash sweeps may force early repayment, and higher margin on the loan at the end of the 
tenor gives incentives for shortening the tenor. In case the project should default, the bank has 
rights to the projects assets and receivables.  
A significant part of financing PV project is the governmental support arrangements. Feed-in-
tariffs are employed in many countries, and have proven to be a successful mechanism to 
drive technical development and increase competitiveness. In Germany, FITs have 
contributed to increasing the share of renewable energy in the total energy generation. The 
FIT schemes are now being modified and reduced in several countries as a response to the 
industry becoming more competitive. Critics accuse FIT arrangements for creating subsidy 
cycles in the PV industry, and even of market collapse in the Spanish PV market. Much of 
this critic concerns the design of the FIT arrangements, not the idea of subsidies. However, 
grid parity is not yet reached, and PV projects still depend on subsidies. The strong 
dependence on FITs make PV projects exposed to government risk.  
The financial crisis led to a reduction in clean-energy investments due to credit tightening. 
The competition between projects is now higher with regards to receiving funds; therefore the 
project developers must spend more effort on convincing the bank about the capability of 
their project. While the first part of the financial crisis seems to be over, the future is uncertain 
especially for European PV developers with the current currency turmoil. Recession may lead 
governments to reduce public spending, which can affect subsidies to the PV industry.  
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5. Case study: PV Project 
5.1 Introduction 
The following section will illustrate the presented theory on project finance with an actual 
case from the PV industry. The project in question will in the following be referred to as “PV 
Project” or “SPV”. Name of the project and participants is kept anonymous. Information 
about the project is acquired through interviews with a central participant and confidential 
documents. A list of the documents is presented in appendix 1.  
The thesis will look at how a real-life PV power plant is project financed with regards to key 
features of project finance, capital structure, contracts and risk management. Central project 
documents will be reviewed to describe parties involved, terms and process of project 
financing the power plant. Finally I will analyse advantages and disadvantages of project 
finance in light of this particular project, and compare PV Project to other project financed 
ventures. The analysis also attempts to suggest improvements to the structure of PV Project.  
The analysis does not include the financial model of PV Project as this is confidential. 
However section 6 contains a financial model of a hypothetical PV plant.   
5.2 Key features of PV Project 
Organisational structure 
PV Project is an expansion of an already existing PV power plant located in Germany. With 
this expansion the capacity of the solar plant will be around 5 MW annually. PV Project is a 
special purpose vehicle fully owned by one sponsor. Debt is provided by two banks; one 
government-owned development bank and one international, commercial finance institution. 
Other central participants in the project are the EPCI contractor, the O&M provider, local 
authorities, the insurer, and the grid operator. Figure 7 illustrates the organisational structure 
of PV Project.  
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Figure 7 Organisational structure PV Project 
Capital structure 
The capital structure of PV Project consists of approximately 35 % equity and 65 % debt. The 
loan from the finance institution is regulated by a loan agreement between the bank and the 
SPV. The loan agreement is a result of the negotiations with the bank. The indicative term 
sheet and the loan agreement contain many of the conditions and restrictions term sheets 
normally include. The terms are discussed in section 5.3.  
Technology 
PV Project makes use of polysilicon PV technology. Three different reports from independent 
engineers estimate the annual yield and the performance ratio of the power plant. They all 
consider the modules, inverters, cell technology and design of the park as well as 
meteorological data when calculating expected yield. Their results are all in the same range, 
the yield estimate varies with only a few kWh per kWp.  
Feed-in-tariffs 
PV Project qualifies for receiving feed-in-tariffs under the German Renewable Energy 
Sources Act, EEG. The tariffs for solar are fixed for 20 years. The output of the project is sold 
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to a grid operator and in return PV Project receives feed-in-tariffs per MWh delivered. 
Because of the degression rate in the FIT arrangement, a delay in the project may cause lower 
tariffs.  
 
5.3 Terms of the loan agreement  
The tenor of the term loan is 16 years. This ensures that the loan is repaid 4 years before the 
revenue stream from feed-in-tariffs end. The loan agreement specifies the fee structure; a one-
time structuring fee (i.e. up-front fee), and a commitment fee to be paid monthly. The loan 
agreement require entering an interest derivative contract in the form of an interest swap, and 
emphasises that this is a separate contract which will continue even though the loan 
agreement is terminated.  
Security 
The bank secures its interests in a list of 11 collaterals. This list includes transfer of several 
project rights to the bank in case of project default. These rights include the rights the 
purchase agreement, insurance policies, warranty agreement and usage rights. When it comes 
to reserve accounts the loan agreements require a debt service reserve account (DSRA), a 
maintenance and reserve account (MRA) and the accrual of an additional reserve account for 
dismantling the PV plant. The magnitude of the reserve account in total is around 200,000 
Eur. The reserve accounts are established during the first years of the loan period and 
maintained for the entire tenor. The purpose of these accounts is to cover unexpected 
expenses which arise during the life time of the project, without affecting the project’s debt 
service coverage ratios.  
Cash flow waterfall and disbursement of dividends  
The next item in the loan agreement is the cash flow waterfall, which determines the priority 
of the claims on the project’s cash flows. Operating costs including insurance premium have 
first priority, followed by debt service, payments to the DSRA, payments to the other reserve 
accounts, and last, disbursement of dividends. In order to pay out dividends, 22 specified 
criteria must be fulfilled. This list includes presentation of signed versions of all relevant 
contracts and agreements, having opened accounts, provided promised equity, all rights to the 
project being transferred to the SPV, verification of technical requirements and proof that the 
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project fulfils the requirements according to the building permit. The bank also requests 
copies of official land register maps, where the site of the photovoltaic plant, the cable route 
and the transfer point to the utility company are identified. Further, the bank requires proof of 
the operating costs. If the costs exceed the previous calculated operating costs, the amount of 
equity must be increased in order to maintain the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) at 
minimum 1.2.  
The terms of the loan agreement are all aimed at securing the bank’s interests. Maturity, 
collateral, security and cash flow waterfall are among the many measures put in place to 
ensure that the loan is repaid, and to give the bank access to assets and funds in case of 
default. Together with requirements during construction and operations this illustrates the 
strong creditor involvement in project finance. The banks’ participation in the project is 
advantageous because it is aimed at protecting the project from risk, but can also be 
unfavorable as it is time-consuming and not always in line with the equity holders’ wishes. 
Equity is a residual claim with limited liability (may depend on the degree of recourse) and 
therefore more in favor of risk. Since the banks only have downside potential, conflicts may 
arise in situations where equity investors want to take more risk.   
5.4 Contracts 
The establishment of PV Project and the construction of the power plant are regulated in a 
series of contracts. I will here present the most important contracts and central content. In the 
following section I will analyse how these contracts affect risk management.  
Transfer of rights agreement 
A highly central contract in the establishment of the solar park is the Transfer of rights 
agreement. The process of constructing a solar park often begins with a solar project 
developing company obtaining all the necessary rights and permits to build and operate the 
PV plant. The rights to the project are then sold to the sponsor. The Transfer of rights 
agreement contains all these rights and the System purchase agreement, stating the price of 
the transaction. 
In this case, the developer transfers its ownership share in PV Project (i.e. 100 %) to the 
sponsor including all rights to the solar park in return the sponsor pays the solar developer a 
certain price. The rights to PV Project include land lease and land use agreements with 
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property owners, building permit from the authorities, an urban development agreement with 
the municipality, and contract with the grid operator.   
The Transfer of rights agreement defines the purpose of the agreement, which is the 
construction of a PV plant, and the purchase price of the share in SPV (i.e. 100 %).  
PV Project does not own the land where the plant is located, but leases the area. Therefore, 
the land lease agreements with the property owners are essential. These contracts regulate the 
purpose of the lease, duration, termination, remuneration, and liability. The lease period is 20 
years from start of construction. The annual rent is a certain share of the FIT revenues 
multiplied with a size factor. The contracts entitle the SPV to build the necessary transmission 
lines, transformer, roads and fences on the site. In addition to the land lease agreements, the 
SPV has also signed a land use agreement with the property owners regarding right of way for 
grid connection cables.  
The contract with the grid operator ensures access to the grid, and allows the SPV to feed a 
specified maximum quantity of electricity into the grid annually.  
The contracts with the authorities include the building permit which approves the plans for the 
construction. This permit also contains specific and detailed requirements to ecological 
compensation areas, also known as “green space compensation”. This is a special requirement 
for German PV plants, which entail planting and maintain certain areas. Other contracts with 
governmental agencies regulate the deconstruction of the plant after discontinuation.   
EPCI contract 
The EPCI contract states the obligations of the contractor, which include planning, 
construction, transport, completion, installation, testing and commissioning of the planned 
solar park. The contractor must install the solar park in accordance with specifications and 
within the agreed timeframe. The specifications include following best industry practice, 
requirements from the insurer, and German law. The contract states that the solar park shall be 
handed over “turnkey ready”, meaning that the park must be connected to the power grid and 
ready to feed electricity into the grid. According to the contract, the EPCI contractor ensures 
that the park is constructed in compliance with all permits, agreements, authorisations, 
approvals, certifications and expert opinions.  
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The contract determines the latest possible date for start of operation. This is important since 
the start of operations determine the level of the feed-in-tariff. If the plant starts operating 
before this date, but the taking over process is not finalised, all revenues from FIT and 
operating expenses accrue to the SPV. The contract further specifies the base purchase price 
based on certain assumptions about yield and performance. In case these variables are 
changed, there will be adjustments made to the price. The contract also defines payment 
terms, including a security deposit which allows the SPV to withhold a certain percentage of 
the purchase price for 5 years after start of operations. This ensures that the EPCI contractor 
can cover potential warranty claims.  
Further, the agreement regulates the taking over procedure, testing period, warranties, 
limitation of liability and general contractual terms. The taking over procedure consists of 
three parts; technical, legal and final taking over. For the technical taking over the SPV 
appoints a technical expert to do an audit of the capacity, functionality, and whether the plant 
is built according to specifications. The legal taking over is performed either by the SPV itself 
or by a legal firm appointed by the SPV. The purpose of this is to ensure that all assets are 
transferred from the EPCI contractor to the SPV, that all the rights described in the Transfer 
of rights agreement are valid and transferred to the SPV, and that all other conditions for the 
taking over are fulfilled. In the final taking over, the contractor and a representative from the 
SPV inspects the completion of minor outstanding works. The results of all three parts are 
documented in written protocols.  
Prior to the taking over procedure is a testing period of 100 hours in order to test electrical 
and mechanical components and to make sure that the productivity is as promised. The EPCI 
contract specifies warranties, which are central in mitigation of technical risks. For the solar 
park the warranty lasts 5 years, for the modules 5 years and the inverters 2 years.  
O&M contract 
The O&M contract is similar to the EPCI contract. It describes how the O&M contractor shall 
perform monitoring, operation, routine maintenance and repairs of the solar park on behalf of 
the SPV. The contractor is to perform these tasks in compliance with applicable law, specified 
regulation and standards, permits, requirements from the grid operator, warranty conditions, 
and insurance conditions. The contact specifies how monitoring and maintenance is to be 
carried out, and what documentation of operational data and yield data the O&M contractor 
must record. The O&M contractor is also responsible for warranty and insurance 
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management. The installed inverter comes with an extended warranty that includes full 
coverage of material and labour costs related to repairs. In addition to the regular O&M tasks, 
the contractor is responsible for property management. This includes ensuring that vegetation 
around the modules is kept low in order to prevent shadows, and maintenance of the 
ecological compensation areas.  
Remuneration of the O&M contractor consists of an annual fixed amount which is adjusted 
with a fixed percentage every year, and a possible over performance bonus from year 3. The 
bonus applies whenever the electricity production exceeds the expected production estimated 
in the base case calculation. In years when this occurs the O&M contractor receives 50 % of 
the FITs from the first 6 % of the excess electricity production, independent of the reason for 
the over performance. This incentivises the contractor to contribute more than the required 
minimum effort. 
Insurance contracts 
The insurance coverage of PV project consists of three parts; photovoltaic facility insurance, 
third-party liability insurance, and a profit shortfall insurance. The first two insurance policies 
cover physical damage and injuries to personnel and include standard terms. The third form of 
insurance, the profit shortfall insurance, is a more specialised insurance. This policy is 
applicable when the actual obtained yield is more than 10 % lower than the predicted annual 
yield. The calculation of the profit shortfall is as follows:  
                           
Where 
a = 90 % of the predicted annual yield (kWh) 
b = actual energy yield (kWh) 
c = reimbursement rate (cents/kWh), i.e. the feed-in-tariff 
d = indemnity from other policies 
The annual predicted yield is confirmed by experts on behalf of the insurance company. The 
maximum indemnity is 30 % of the predicted annual yield, implying that the policy covers a 
loss when the actual yield is 10 to 30 % lower than expected. Under the policy, PV Project is 
obligated to disclose information about the plant and technical details about the modules, 
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inverters, radiation, utilisation degree of the plant and the individual systems to the insurer. 
This information must be approved by an independent expert.  
The policy insures profit shortfalls caused by reduced global irradiation, material defects, 
wear and tear of the plant, pollution of the plant or parts of the plant, and internal operational 
failures of modules or invertors. Causes not covered are maloperation of equipment, 
interruptions or disconnection from the power network, breakdown of the supply meter, 
maintenance work, or trees or buildings clouding the modules.  
The profit shortfall insurance may at first seem valuable, but further assessment reveals that 
this policy is rather worthless. The insurance is only available for short durations implying 
that if the SPV experiences a profit shortfall that is covered and is granted indemnity, the 
insurance company will know this when the SPV wishes to renew the policy. The SPV have 
then “revealed” the true level of irradiation and the insurance company reduces the base case 
estimates. 
Expected variation in irradiation is around 10 %, making the policy relevant only for more 
extreme changes in irradiation level. After a few years, the insurer learns what the normal 
irradiation level is, and adjusts the base caste estimate accordingly. The remaining uncertainty 
is the normal variation, which is not insured. The policy is not very costly, this is however not 
surprising given the low benefit of the policy. 
5.5 Risk management  
PV Project faces several of the risk sources described in section 2. I will in this section 
present the most relevant risks to the project, what mechanisms are employed to mitigate the 
risks, and to what party the risks are allocated. An overview is presented in a risk matrix in 
table 7.  
Technical risk 
The technical risks in the project are concerned with the materials and components used. 
Choosing experienced technology suppliers with good track records is important to avoid 
deficiencies.   
Technical risks are allocated mainly to the EPCI contractor and other suppliers through 
warranties. As an example, the industry has experienced problems with frequent break downs 
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of inverters. This risk is handled by a warranty extension with duration of 20 years. The 
warranty obliges the inverter manufacturer to perform scheduled maintenance and service as 
well as being available for emergency repairs. This is important because a stop in production 
leads to reduced profits. If an inverter breaks down during the high irradiation months, a 
greater part of that year’s revenue can be lost. The Transfer of rights agreement makes sure all 
warranties are transferred to the SPV.  
Mitigation of the technical risks is obtained through technical due diligence and the technical 
taking over. In the technical due diligence, an independent engineer reviews the components 
and design of the park. Further mitigation is gained from monitoring performance and 
carrying out necessary maintenance as stated in the O&M contract.   
Political risk: Legal risk 
PV Project operates in Germany, a country with a well functioning, stable justice system. This 
reduces the possibility of legal disputes and provides sound conditions for the project. A 
reliable legal environment is especially important in project finance because of the many 
contracts involved. For PV Project the Transfer of rights agreement, land lease agreements, 
and building permit are all essential to the success of the project. Problems with interpreting 
or implementing the contracts, can cause costly delays or even prevent the project from being 
realised.  
A regulatory risk present in all PV projects is the risk of changes or elimination of the feed-in-
tariff system. There are currently discussions regarding continuation of the FITs. A reduction 
of tariffs and phase-out of the German Renewable Sources Act is likely in the long-term, but 
changes being made to the existing tariffs seem unlikely. Other sources of uncertainty are the 
general risk of increased taxes and general political risks. In politically stable countries such 
as Germany, war and civil strife and expropriation are less likely.  
Legal due diligence, the legal taking over and continuous follow up done by the SPV are 
measures contributing to mitigate the legal risks. The legal due diligence reviews all 
agreements and warranties in order to reveal potential problems, and makes recommendations 
on how to handle these.  
Operating risk 
The main operating risks PV Project faces are the performance risks due to estimation errors 
in the yield report, planned or unplanned downtime, grid cut-offs, force majeure events, 
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failure of counterparties, and unexpected operating costs. Overestimation in the yield report 
regarding solar resources and performance ratio leads to reduced production and hence lower 
revenues, than expected. Downtime and grid-cut offs are especially unfavourable during 
summer and day-time which is high irradiation periods. Counterparty failure concerns both 
performance and payment failure of central project participants. Important payments to the 
project are feed-in-tariffs, insurance claims and warranty claims. Unexpected operating costs 
may arise from major repairs not covered in the O&M agreements, lawsuits and tax disputes.  
The performance risks connected with errors in yield estimation is mitigated through the 
technical due diligence performed by an independent engineer who evaluates the input in the 
yield calculations. Scheduling of planned repair work and downtime can prevent production 
stops in periods with high irradiation. Unplanned repair and grid cut-offs cannot be avoided, 
but the consequences can to some extent be limited through building a maintenance reserve, 
which covers unexpected costs without deteriorating the debt service ability and avoids 
breach of the loan agreement terms. Force majeure events are mitigated through the insurance 
contracts. A special feature of PV Project’s insurance contracts is the profit shortfall 
insurance. This policy covers losses due to lower irradiation than expected. However, this 
policy only applies for large deviations and is of little value after the first times it has paid out 
an indemnity.  
The risks of counterparty failure and unexpected operating costs are reduced through active 
contract management and scoping of the O&M contract. Contract management include 
selecting suppliers, negotiation, and following up after signing. The over performance bonus 
in the O&M contract reduces the risk of the contractor only contributing minimum effort. The 
operating risks are distributed among the insurer, the O&M contractor and PV Project.  
Financial risk  
Financial risks relevant for PV Project are interest rate risk, credit risk and inflation risk. 
Currency risk is less relevant for PV Project since both costs and revenues are denoted in 
Euro. The risk of interest rates changes is hedged through an interest swap, required in the 
loan agreement. Inflation is a source of risk especially since German feed-in-tariffs are not 
inflation regulated. If cost inflation is high in the coming years, there will be an imbalance 
between costs and revenues. Another financial risk PV Project faces is the risk of 
counterparties not being able to fulfil their obligations. An example is the credit risk of the 
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EPCI contractor during the warranty period. This risk is mitigated through a security deposit 
containing funds for a potential warranty claim.  
 
Construction and completion risk 
The construction and completion risk is concerned with events causing a delay in the project. 
This can be Force Majeure risks, cost overruns, material defects and legal defects. The risk of 
force majeure events is allocated to the insurer. Most of the remaining construction and 
completion risk is borne by the EPCI contractor because of the turn-key EPCI contract, stating 
a fixed price and time frame for the project.  
Risk matrix 
The risk matrix summarises the most important risks PV Project must deal with, what 
mechanisms are utilised to mitigate the risks and to what party they are allocated to. The 
contracts are central in both risk mitigation and risk allocation, but it is important to note that 
contracts are incomplete and there is always remaining risks, which the project company or 
the sponsors must cover.  
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Risk:  Mitigation 
mechanism: 
Allocation to: 
Completion risk Turn-key  EPCI contract EPCI contractor 
Completion risk: the 
project company lack 
the rights to the 
project 
Transfer of rights 
agreement 
SPV/Sponsor 
Completion risk: cost 
overruns 
Fixed price EPCI 
contract 
EPCI contractor 
Technical risk Warranties, 
guarantees  
EPCI contractor, 
technology supplier, 
equipment 
manufacturer 
Technical 
risk/operating risk 
Testing period  EPCI contractor 
Technical risk Technical taking over EPCI contractor 
Technical risk Final taking over EPCI contractor 
Financial risk: Interest 
rate risk 
Interest rate swap Bank  
Financial risk: 
Credit risk of EPCI 
contractor 
Security deposit 
regulated in EPCI 
contract 
EPCI contractor 
Political risk: legal risk Legal taking over SPV/Sponsor 
Force Majeure risk Insurance   Insurance provider 
Third part liability Third part liability 
insurance 
Insurance provider 
Force Majeure risk/ 
technical risk: level of 
yield 
Profit shortfall 
insurance 
Insurance provider 
Market risk: Revenue 
risk 
Feed-in-tariffs Government 
Operational risk O&M contract, 
guarantees  
O&M contractor, 
equipment 
manufacturer 
Operational risk Extended inverter 
warranty 
Inverter manufacturer  
Operational risk: O&M 
contractor 
underperform 
Over performance 
bonus  
SPV/Sponsor 
Operational risk: O&M 
cost increase 
Fixed O&M price O&M contractor 
 
 
Table 7 Risk matrix PV Project 
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5.6 Case analysis 
PV Project is an example of project finance in practice. The project entails the typical features 
predicted by the theory on project finance; separate incorporation, one sponsor and high 
leverage. The web of contracts delegates responsibilities to the project participants and is a 
central part of risk management. The loan agreement with its numerous covenants underlines 
the bank’s strong position in project finance.  
Project finance is suitable for PV Project for various reasons. Since the revenues are fixed, 
and the operating costs are fairly low, the project is relatively predictable. PV Project makes 
use of a relatively new, but proven technology, which leaves little room for alterations after 
construction. The fact that there are few built in options in the project, also underlines the 
predictability of the project. Naturally, there is uncertainty regarding whether the project will 
be realised according to the predictions, but these risks are being handled in the thorough risk 
management process.  
This analysis will compare PV Project to other photovoltaic projects and other project 
financed ventures in order to see how the project is affected by financing and what 
improvements could be made done to the structure of the project. The analysis also compares 
PV Project with the rationale of project finance presented in the theory section 1.  
PV Project and other photovoltaic projects 
PV Project differs from other photovoltaic projects with respects to several features such as to 
size of the plant, leverage and shorter maturity of the term loan. 5 MW is quite small 
compared to the projects described in section 4.1.1; PV project corresponds to only 9 % of the 
Lieberose project, which is predicted to be the largest in Germany. This does not however 
imply that small projects are unusual, but information about smaller parks is not given the 
same attention by the media. PV Project has a debt level of 65 %, which is within the leverage 
range found in the analysis of recent project financed PV parks, but in the lower percentile. 
The maturity of the loan is 16 years, whereas 18 years seems from the term sheet review and 
analysis of PV parks to be most common. A possible reason for the somewhat shorter tenor 
may be the fact that the loan agreement does not entail a cash sweep mechanism as opposed to 
other loans. The cash sweep forces prepayment and shortens the effective maturity.  
The differences described above represent areas where potential changes can be made to the 
structure of PV Project. The fact that the size of the project is relatively small can be a 
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drawback since project finance is predicted to be better suited for larger projects due to high 
transaction costs. If the size were greater, the project would be able to capture economies of 
scale in the form of lower legal and advisory fees per Euro invested. For instance must a small 
project obtain the same contracts and permits with the same number of counterparties as a 
larger project. The negotiations in large projects are naturally more comprehensive, but there 
may be room for some savings due to economies of scale. Constructing a larger plant could 
reduce the transaction costs in proportion to capex. In order to achieve this, the project might 
need support from another sponsor, as it otherwise would be too big for one company. A joint 
venture structure may also permit higher leverage, since cross-collateral between the sponsors 
can be obtained. In addition to higher leverage, this structure may provide better credit terms., 
for example lower interest rates and longer maturity, possibly longer than the current 16 years 
tenor. However, there may be physical or regulatory limitations restraining a size increase.  
Another alternative for profiting from economies of scale is to organise the project as part of a 
portfolio of projects. A portfolio structure allows for organising smaller projects in the same 
manner, using the same technology, the same O&M contractor and the same suppliers hence 
saving costs. Pooling projects into portfolios require the projects to have similar 
characteristics. Esty (2002) mentions project holding companies when he compares project 
finance and other financing structures. He claims that as the number of projects in portfolios 
increase, the structure will have more in common with corporate finance, since cross-
collateralisation between the projects increase.  
Source of funds is another possible improvement area for PV Project. A bond issue is 
probably not achievable as the project is too small for the bond market. Lease financing to 
obtain tax benefits and avoiding equipment risk may be a possibility. Refinancing can attract 
other investors with another risk preference after a few years of operations when the 
composition of risk is changed. At that point, the risk of delay and construction risks are 
resolved, and the participants have more knowledge of the commercial ability of the project. 
However, the loan agreement has covenants regarding changes to ownership of the project 
which can put a stop to such a transaction. There are also unwinding costs of terminating the 
loan agreement before maturity, especially with respects to the hedging contract since this 
contract is customised for the project. It is important to note that while these proposed 
changes could have a positive impact on the project, they may not be feasible. The financial 
structure of the project is a result of the accessible financial alternatives at the time the project 
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was initiated. The structure may be a consequence of limited opportunities, rather than a 
choice from a broad range of alternatives.   
PV Project and other project financed ventures 
Compared to examples of project finance in other industries, PV Project is relatively 
uncomplicated. The project involves a relatively restricted number of uncertainties; limited to 
technology, yield, and time of start-up and corresponding feed-in-tariffs. An example of a 
project with more complex risk exposure is the Euro Disneyland Project initiated by the Walt 
Disney Company in 1988. A case study done by Finnerty (2007) presents the numerous 
uncertainties this project faced because of the many business areas the project involved. In 
addition to the theme park with attractions, shops and restaurants, the project entailed resorts 
and real estate. Euro Disneyland experienced uncertainty regarding cultural differences 
between American and European values and behavioural patterns, price forecasts on tickets, 
general price movements, attendance estimates, real estate projections, and what turned out to 
be a European recession. All these risks combined with a very high leverage almost caused 
bankruptcy and forced the Disney Corporation to contribute more equity. Although Euro 
Disneyland for these reasons may be perceived as an unsuccessful project, it is also an 
example of how an investor comprehends all risks involved, and protects existing business 
from the outcome of the project through separate incorporation of the new project. PV Project 
is of course a much smaller project than Euro Disneyland, but the comparison illustrates the 
straightforward nature of the project and the reasonably comprehensible risk exposure.  
PV Project also has the advantage of having a public off-taker in a country with low 
probability of default, hence reducing credit risk and providing security for project financing. 
The German Renewable Sources Act (EEG) gives renewable power priority in the grid, 
thereby reducing demand risk and the risk of competition from other power generating 
technologies. This, however, makes the project exposed to regulatory risk, but since the 
project is located in Germany, sudden regulatory changes are less likely.   
A possible disadvantage of PV Project compared to other projects, is that the market for the 
project’s assets is less liquid compared to markets for other assets classes. This is mainly a 
concern to the bank as it reduces the value of the collaterals in case of project default, but in 
turn also a disadvantage for the project. If the project defaults, the bank has pledge on the 
assets and project rights, and can either take over operations of the plant, or sell the assets to 
recover as much as possible of their receivables. Awerbuch (2000) argues that PV systems 
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easily can be dismantled and sold as modules. However, other projects may have more 
marketable assets. Shleifer and Vishny’s theory (1992) claims that the buyers for a project’s 
assets are often found in the same industry. When a project is in default, the underlying 
reasons for the difficulties are likely to affect its competitors as well, leaving the project with 
no potential buyers for its assets. Shleifer and Vishny predict that asset illiquidity is a 
potentially important cost of leverage. More specialised assets, which are the case in PV 
Project, have lower reutilisation value, thus less liquid. This leads to increased credit support 
for such projects, whereas PV projects may be considered less attractive to banks. 
PV Project and corporate finance  
Financing PV Project in a corporate finance structure may affect several aspects of the 
project. Project financed ventures have higher leverage than conventionally financed projects. 
Therefore, in a corporate finance structure, PV Project is likely to be financed with less debt.  
The internal due diligence process would probably be the same, but less effort and internal 
resources would be needed for convincing the bank of the project’s viability. Co-insurance 
and cross-collateralisation gained from the company’s other activities and assets reduces the 
bank’s risk and thereby the need for a lengthy due diligence process. The bank will in this 
situation consider the whole company when deciding debt capacity, taking the company’s 
reputation and position in the market into account. In cases where the company has an 
existing relation with the bank, the process of applying for new debt can be quicker, as the 
assessment of the company is already performed and the bank has knowledge of the 
company’s activities.  
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) found that third-party guarantees are more important in 
project finance loans than other comparable loans. Therefore it is likely that such guarantees 
would play a less central role if PV Project was corporately financed. Reduced importance of 
contracts makes the negotiation process shorter and reduces the costs of advisory and legal 
fees, though contracts still are crucial to the realisation of the project. According to Kleimeier 
and Megginson’s study, the spreads on project finance loans are not higher than those of other 
loans; therefore are the financing costs not likely to be reduced. However, less internal 
resources and lower advisory and legal fees may lower the transaction costs.  
The comparison of project finance and corporate finance in section 1.5, suggested that 
managerial discretion is higher in corporate finance structures. For PV Project, higher 
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managerial discretion could mean increased flexibility and the possibility of making decisions 
quicker. There would still be covenants to relate to, but of a less specific nature, leaving the 
managers to make choices about suppliers and other operational decisions without approval 
from the bank.   
PV Project and rationale for project finance 
The theory presented in section 1 proposes different explanations to the rational of project 
finance.    
Brealey et al argue (1998) that project finance reduces the agency costs which could incur if 
the project was not separately incorporated. If PV Project was a part of the sponsor company, 
the agency relationship in question would be the conventional relationship between 
shareholders (principal) and managers (agent). Possible conflicts in this setting can arise from 
risk averse managers and differing incentives. Managers who are more concerned with their 
own interests than those of the agent may engage in empire building or favor their own pet 
projects. PV Project is unlikely to contribute to empire building as the project is relatively 
small, and the level of prestige and status that comes with it is rather low. If PV Project was 
one of many investment opportunities in a large corporation where managers value such 
project characteristics, PV Project could have difficulties competing with other projects with 
more perquisites and would maybe not be initiated.  
Jensen’s (1986) theory on how debt can reduce free cash flow and consequently reduce 
agency costs corresponds well with project financed debt based on a sculpted repayment 
structure. Sculpting adjusts annual debt service requirement to the cash available for 
repayment in each year, thereby reducing the free cash flow. This way of limiting free cash 
flow is less applicable in sizeable companies with large, co-mingled cash flows. 
Agency costs of free cash flow seem likely to arise in the situation where PV Project is part of 
a corporate structure. The transparency of separate incorporation gives rise to improved cost 
control and eases the process of reducing spending. In addition, it makes PV Project 
responsible for all expenses, whereas large companies entail the possibility of deficits being 
covered by other activity areas.  
Another benefit of project finance is how the structure enables tailor-made corporate 
governance measures. Since the continuous O&M work is out-sourced to a contractor the 
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project has few employees, and because there are few decisions to be made after the project is 
commissioned, this advantage appears less relevant for PV Project.  
Shah and Thakor’s theory (1987) explains the rationale of project finance in connection with 
asymmetric information. Inevitably, there is some degree of asymmetric information inherent 
in PV Project. Even though the bank has conducted a thorough due diligence process, project 
managers and the sponsor will have more information about the project, for example updated 
knowledge of technology, marked conditions and project participants resulting from hands-on 
experience.  
Shah and Thakor have a more theoretical approach than Brealey et al and Esty, which is 
difficult to compare with one particular case. PV Project has a relatively high leverage, 
though lower than many other projects in the same industry. According to Shah and Thakor 
this implies that PV Project is a risky project, but less risky than its comparables. It is hard to 
make a conclusion on whether there is some truth to this prediction without more information 
about other projects. The implications of their theory should be investigated on a broader 
selection of projects with different characteristics of risk level, leverage and interest rates in 
order to evaluate the practical relevance. 
Esty (1999) proposes a rationale for project finance with respects to four types of investment 
distortions. The first is the already mentioned free cash flow problem. The second is asset 
substitution, which is also difficult to evaluate with regards to one project. If however, the 
sponsor wishes to obtain financing for projects later, asset substitution should be avoided out 
of consideration for the company’s reputation.  
The third investment distortion in Esty’s theory is debt overhang. Whether this could prevent 
PV Project from being realised if it was part of a large corporation depends on the capital 
structure of the sponsor. If the sponsor has debt in place, debt overhang can be a problem for 
the realisation of the project. I do not have this information about PV Project’s sponsor, but 
cannot dismiss the possibility of this investment distortion.  
The fourth investment distortion; risk aversion among managers leading to underinvestment 
in risky, positive NPV projects, may be the most relevant in practice. Project finance avoids 
risk contamination on a company’s other activity, thereby limiting possible negative 
consequences to the project, and making it easier for managers to undertake risky 
investments. The risk attitude in a sponsor company may depend on what line of business the 
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company is in compared to the proposed project. If the investment opportunity represents a 
new focus area, managers may be more risk averse compared to investing in the core activity 
area of the company. The risk management feature of project finance seems to be the 
advantage with the highest practical relevance.   
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6. Financial model  
6.1 Methodology  
The success or failure of a project financed investment is determined by the project’s ability 
to generate sufficient cash flows to service debt and provide a satisfactory return to the equity 
holders. Therefore the financial model which evaluates a project’s economic viability 
becomes essential to the project participants. The financial model is a spreadsheet designed to 
gather input and make calculations in order to assess overall project performance. The input to 
the financial model consists of macroeconomic assumptions, capital structure, investment 
costs, revenues, operating costs and the loan repayment schedule.  
The output of the model includes cash flow statement, balance sheet, key ratios and 
drawdown of equity and debt. The model is useful in all stages of the project. First, the 
financial model is useful for due diligence when the project is being evaluated by potential 
lenders. Second, the model is valuable when sponsors and creditors negotiate terms such as 
loan terms and covenants. Finally, the model is an important tool in the construction period 
for monitoring the progress and performance of the project.  
Valuation 
The cash flow statement is prepared based on estimates of cash flows to the project. This 
statement provides an input for the income statement and the free cash flow calculation. Since 
the project company has only one purpose the retention ratio is zero; after satisfying the 
demands of the loan agreement, all profits are distributed to the investors as dividends.  
The free cash form the basis of the valuation of the project. Free cash flow is determined by 
the following formula (EBIT is earning before interest and taxes): 
                                                                   
According to Brealey et al (2008) the appropriate valuation technique for project financed 
investments is the Adjusted Present Value (APV) since the debt ratio is not constant, but 
typically high in the first years and reduces over the years of operation. The APV calculates a 
base-case NPV (net present value) as if the investment was all-equity financed and accounts 
for effects of financing separately. Other valuation techniques, such as the Weighted Average 
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Cost of Capital (WACC) incorporate financing effects in one calculation, but is less suited 
when the debt-to-value ratio varies.  
                                                            
An important financing effect is the interest tax shield of debt. The APV is then the base-case 
NPV plus the present value of the tax shield:  
       
    
 
 
      
        
  
 
     
                
Where 
FCFt = free cash flow in year t 
ρ = unlevered cost of equity 
n = lifetime of the project 
Dt = face value of debt in year t 
rd = cost of debt 
rf = risk-free rate 
Rm = market risk premium 
βU = unlevered beta 
tc = corporate tax rate 
If the calculated APV is positive, the project increases value and should be undertaken.  
Debt coverage ratios  
Debt coverage ratios indicate a project’s financial sustainability and are of interest to the 
lenders when evaluating their margin of safety. The lending bank will often require the 
average debt coverage ratios to stay above a minimum level. There are several varieties of 
such ratios. Two commonly used ratios are the Debt service cover ratio (DSCR) and the Loan 
life cover ratio (LLCR). The DSCR is used to evaluate the project company’s capability to 
service debt on an annual basis, whereas the LLCR evaluates the same ability over the whole 
loan term. The DSCR is the ratio between the cash available for debt service (CAD) in any 
given year and the required debt service in that year. Cash available for debt service is equal 
to the cash flow from operations before interest expenses. The LLCR is the ratio between two 
discounted flows; the NPV of cash flows available for debt service over the remaining term, 
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and the NPV of the remaining debt service requirements. If the LLCR is greater than 1, there 
is a surplus available to the sponsors if they were to liquidate the project immediately. The 
definitions of the ratios are shown below:  
 
      
    
   
 
      
 
    
      
   
   
  
 
Where  
CADt = cash available for debt service in year t  
DSt = debt service in year t (= instalmentt + interestt) 
Dt = outstanding debt at the end of year t 
i = interest rate of debt 
s = time of valuation  
s + n = last year of debt repayment 
 
Another profitability measure is the internal rate of return (IRR), given by the formula:  
     
     
        
  
 
   
 
The IRR rule is to accept projects when the IRR is higher than the opportunity cost of capital. 
The IRR is subject to several shortcomings compared to the NPV (and APV, since this is an 
extension of the NPV). For instance, if the project contains both negative and positive cash 
flows, or there are mutually exclusive projects, the IRR rule can be misleading. The IRR is 
however widely used in practice and can provide an indication of whether or not the project 
should be undertaken. 
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6.2 Discussion of financial model and results 
In this section, I will present the results of a financial model for a PV plant located in 
Germany. Since the financial information about PV Project is confidential I have made a 
general financial model for a PV park with industry standard costs as input. Based on a set of 
assumptions, the model prepares an income statement, cash flow statement and loan balance, 
which then is used to calculate the adjusted present value (APV), internal rate of return (IRR), 
and coverage ratios. After presenting the main assumptions I will present the results of the 
valuation and a sensitivity analysis. The model makes certain simplifications, but still 
provides a good basis for the analysis.  
Main assumptions and input 
The park is assumed to start generating electricity in year 2008, when the German feed-in-
tariffs were 354.9 EUR/MWh, fixed for 20 years. The revenue each year is found by 
multiplying the applicable tariff with the annual energy output, given in MWh per year. The 
output is a function of average annual yield (kWh/kWp) and effective installed capacity 
(kWp). The output also takes into account diminishing module efficiency.  
 
Operating costs and the purchase price of the system are based on 2008-level prices in 
Germany. The opex and capex are 35 and 3700 EUR/kWp respectively, resulting in a total 
capex of 18.72m EUR. The annual energy generation of the park is 5500 MWh. The 
calculation of taxes is simplified compared to the German tax system. The effective annual 
tax rate is assumed to be 28 %. Changes in working capital are negligible.  
 
The useful life of the park is 20 years, equal to the German FIT guaranteed period. The capital 
structure consists of a senior term loan and equity. The amount of equity and debt is 
determined by the leverage, which is an input variable in the model. Initially, the leverage is 
assumed to be 70 %. The 13m EUR loan is subject to the typical terms found in the review of 
the actual term sheets in section 4.1.3, except for certain simplifications. The repayment 
follows a sculpted structure where annual instalments are modelled according to cash flows 
available for debt service each year, taking into account a minimum debt service coverage 
ratio of 1.3, according to the following formulas: 
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Where 
rd = cost of debt 
CADt = cash available for debt service in year t 
The requirement of the debt service reserve account is an amount equal to the debt service for 
the next six months. The up-front fee is 2 % of the loan amount. The model assumes there is 
no salvage value. This assumption will be discussed in the analysis in the last paragraph of 
this section.  
The input to the model is summarised in table 8.  
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 Financial model – input 
Years of operation 20 
Feed-in-tariff 
(EUR/MWh) 
354.9 
Tariff period (years) 20  
Annual yield (kWh/kWp) 1100 
Installed capacity (kWp) 5000 
Tax rate 28 % 
Leverage 70:30 
Nominal interest rate 4 % 
Up-front fee 2 % 
Opex year 1 (EUR/kWp) 35 
System purchase price 
(EUR/kWp) 
3700 
 
Table 8 Initial assumptions financial model 
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Valuation  
Table 9 summarises the parameters used in the APV valuation. The risk-free rate, rf, of 3.70 
% is equal to the interest rate on long-term government bonds in Germany in 2006
24
. The 
market risk premium, E(RM) is 5.30 %, equal to the historical equity premium in Germany 
from 1900 to 2005 according to Dimson et al (2006).  
 Valuation parameters 
rf 3.70 % 
E(RM) 5.30 % 
βU 1.60 
rd 4.00 % 
 
Table 9 Valuation parameters 
One approach for approximating the unlevered beta according to Damodaran (2002) is to 
estimate the beta from the fundamental characteristics of the investment using betas of 
comparable firms. This is done by finding the betas of firms operating in the same business as 
the project in question. Since these betas depend on the firms’ financial leverage, they must be 
delevered before an average is calculated. The following formula deleveres the levered beta:  
             
 
 
      
Operating leverage (i.e. cost structure) may also vary among the companies, and should be 
controlled for by calculating a business beta taking into account the average ratio between 
fixed and variable costs.  
In this case, finding publicly listed comparables to the relatively small PV park is difficult. I 
have made a selection of firms in the solar industry in order to provide a rough estimate. 
Ideally, company size, country where the companies are listed, line of business and 
operational leverage should be taken into consideration. However, the purpose of this exercise 
is to illustrate the estimation approach.  The selection of companies is enclosed in appendix 3. 
The calculation could be further refined by not just applying the simple average, but also 
assigning weights to the companies based on different criteria. For simplicity, the calculation 
does not control for operational leverage. Based on data from financialtimes.com an average 
                                                 
24 From http://data.un.org/ 
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unlevered beta is 1.62. The asset beta reflects systematic risk, and since the demand for 
electricity tends to increase in periods of growth hence increasing the prices, the asset beta of 
PV investments is likely to be positive. Despite the shortcomings of the underlying analysis 
estimating the solar industry beta, I will use 1.60 as the unlevered beta in the valuation. 
These input variables lead to an unlevered cost of equity of 12.18 %. Since the cash flows are 
expressed in real terms, they are transformed into nominal values using the German inflation 
in 2006 of 0.60 %
25
. 
Results  
The model calculates a base case NPV of -7122 kEUR. The present value of the tax shield, 
given the cost of debt equal to the interest rate of 4 %, is 954 kEUR. This gives an APV of -
6168 kEUR. The IRR is 5.61 %. A negative APV suggests that the project is unprofitable and 
should not be initiated. However, the scope of this analysis is to study the effect of changes in 
the input variables and financing alternatives, the size of the APV in itself is less interesting. 
Part of the negative APV could be attributed to the simplifications done in estimating cash 
flows. A more thorough approach could give another result. Other changes to the analysis 
which could improve the result will be discussed in the paragraph on financial side effects at 
the end of this section.   
Since the repayment schedule of the term loan is based on a DSCR of 1.3, this is also the 
average and minimum DSCR. The model calculates an average LLCR of 2.68, the minimum 
LLCR is 1.64. This means that on average there is 2.68 EUR available for every 1 EUR of 
outstanding debt. If the project was to liquidate in year 1 when the LLCR is equal to the 
minimum LLCR, the project could fully reimburse the loan of 13,134 kEUR and distribute 
8,931 kEUR to the sponsors (this is equal to 0.64 times the loan amount).  
Sensitivity analysis 
PV plants are subject to a number of risks, all of which may affect the input in the financial 
model. In order to investigate the impact these risks have on the outcome on the project, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted. The sensitivity analysis examines the effect on the APV and 
IRR for changes to the input variables. The purpose of the analysis is to provide an overview 
of the most critical assumptions, which in turn is useful for risk management.  
                                                 
25 From UN Data http://data.un.org/ 
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The risk of delay in construction may lead to reduced feed-in-tariffs if the commercial 
operation date is postponed to the next calendar year. The model assumes the project starts 
operations in 2008, when the tariffs were 354.9 EUR/MWh. If operations start in 2009, the 
prevailing FITs were 319.4 EUR/MWh. This FIT level results in an APV of -7132 kEUR, a 
15 % reduction of the APV. Table 10 shows the changes in the APV for changes in input 
variables. The result is quite sensitive to changes in the tariff level; the changes in the APV 
are greater than the changes in the tariff. A 15 % reduction in tariffs leads to a 23 % reduction 
in APV. The break even tariff level is 527 EUR/MWh, which is significantly higher than the 
2008-level. It is highly unlikely that the tariffs will reach this level, as the current debate in 
Germany concerns reductions in the tariff level, not increases.  
Cost overruns are another source of risk in PV projects. Table 10 displays the project’s 
sensitivity to changes in operating costs (opex) and investment cost (capex). Whereas changes 
to capex have a significant impact on the APV, the APV is less sensitive to opex changes. A 
15 % increase in operating costs leads to an insignificant 1.9 % reduction in APV. The same 
increase in opex results in a 35.8 % decrease in APV. However, the risk of cost overruns 
affecting the investment cost is resolved shortly after construction start, whereas the level of 
operating expenses applies for the whole project life time.   
The risk of the project not performing as predicted is analysed with regards to changes to the 
yield (kWh/kWp). The yield estimates is based on reports prepared by independent engineers. 
These reports also conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to yearly variation in irradiation, 
and find that the deviation from the long-term mean decreases as the measuring period 
increases. A typical 15-year average corresponds to +/- 3.5 % deviation from the mean. The 
annual yield is closely linked to irradiation, hence is a 10 % or 15 % change in yield, as table 
10 is based on, highly unlikely. A 4 % reduction in yield leads to a 6.3 % decrease in APV. 
This indicates that performance risk is present in the project, but not to a large extent.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis with regards to yield presented in table 10 show that the 
percent impact of changes to feed-in-tariffs and yield are the same. This is due to the 
modelling structure; because both variables are input to the calculation of revenues, the 
impact the APV in the same manner.  
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  Change in input variable 
Variable:  + 15 % + 10 % − 10 % − 15 % 
FIT APV 
% change 
-4688 
24.0 % 
-5185 
16.0 % 
-7132 
-15.5 % 
-7605 
-23.3 % 
Capex APV 
% change 
-8399 
-36.2 % 
-7659 
-24.2 % 
-4660 
24.4 % 
-3902 
36.7 % 
Opex APV 
% change 
-6306 
-2.2 % 
-6260 
-1.5 % 
-6075 
1.5 % 
-6029 
2.3 % 
Yield APV 
% change 
-4688 
24.0 % 
-5185 
16.0 % 
-7132 
-15.5 % 
-7605 
-23.3 % 
Table 10 Sensitivity analysis 
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The repayment structure of the term loan is sculpted based on a debt service cover ratio 
(DSCR) of 1.3, resulting in a maturity of the loan of 15 years. Figure 8 shows how changes to 
the repayment schedule of the term loan affect APV and IRR. The varying DSCR is presented 
on the x-axis with the values of APV on the y-axis to the left. The right y-axis display 
resulting maturity illustrated by the red graph. As the DSCR increases, so does the APV. The 
intuition behind this is that as the tenor increases, so does the interest rate tax shield, and 
consequently the APV. Future cash flows are more uncertain than current cash flows, and 
since this is also the case for future and current obligations; postponing repayment with a 
longer maturity is preferred from the sponsors’ perspective. The banks have the opposite 
opinion and wish quicker repayment to ensure that the loan is paid back before, and 
preferably well in advance, discontinuation of the project.  
  
Figure 8 Repayment structure 
The life time of the solar park is assumed to be 20 years, but often the equipment has a useful 
life of 25 to 30 years. Figure 9 shows the effect of extended life time on the APV. The 
revenue period is extended accordingly, even though the German FIT period is 20 years. This 
simplification uses the FIT level as a proxy for revenues after year 20. A more accurate 
approach would be to model revenues from wholesale of electricity after the project no longer 
receives feed-in-tariffs. The x-axis in figure 9 marks years of operation, from 18 years up to 
30. The APV on the left y-axis is higher as the life time is extended, naturally, so is the 
internal rate of return. 
-6398
-6325
-6248
-6168
-6084
-5997
-5907
11
12
13
15
16
18 19
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
-6500
-6400
-6300
-6200
-6100
-6000
-5900
-5800
-5700
-5600
1 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,6
DSCR
NPV Years
NPV
Tenor
 98 
The figure shows as expected that a prolonged lifetime increases the profitability of the 
project. The calculations do not however take into account possible reinvestments due to 
replacement of equipment. This result underlines the potential of the solar park after the tariff 
period, hence should the project company try to find other sources of revenue after the first 20 
years of operations.  
 
Figure 9 Extended life time 
 
The analysis also investigates the effect of increased leverage, see figure 10. Higher leverage 
increases the value of the tax shield, and hence the APV. Higher leverage also leads to longer 
maturity, since the sculpting technique determines repayment. However, a significant increase 
of leverage may lead to higher bankruptcy costs.  
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Figure 10 Increased leverage 
 
Part of what causes the APV of the project to be negative, may be the parameters applied in 
the APV valuation. The IRR of 5.61 % implies that for the project to be valuable, the 
unlevered cost of equity would have to be below 5.61 %.  This IRR does not account for the 
value of the tax shield; the comparable “break-even” unlevered cost of equity is 6.24 %. There 
is a great difference between 6.24 % and the current unlevered cost of equity of 12.18 %, 
hence is a significant increase of the project’s free cash flows or a reconsideration regarding 
the valuation assumptions required for the project to be profitable.  
The valuation assumes a risk premium based on the German historical average. If however, 
the investors do not limit their investments to the German market, the international risk 
premium should be applied. According to Dimson et al (2006) this world historical average 
risk premium from 1900-2005 is 4 %. Replacing the German risk premium with the 
international risk premium, gives an APV of -4462 kEUR, almost 30 % increase compared to 
the initial APV. This difference indicates that the underlying assumptions in the valuation are 
critical to the outcome of the calculations.  
The unlevered beta, βU, and the risk-free, rf, rate also affect the outcome of the valuation, but 
not to the same extent as the risk premium. A reduction of βU from 1.6 to 1.5 increases the 
APV with 6.5 %, whereas reducing the rf with 70 bps to 3 % leads to a 8.6 % change in the 
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APV. Applying all these changes at once, improves the APV with 2780 kEUR, underlining 
the importance of the parameters in the valuation. 
Awerbuch (2000) argues, contrary to the assumptions of this valuation, that PV investments 
have a negative beta. According to his argumentation, fossil price movements have 
historically been counter-cyclical and this will also be the case for the value of electricity 
generated from PV, hence the value of PV investments. Further, he argues that PV 
investments with long-term fixed-price contracts for the output are zero-beta investments. 
Implementing his argument and valuing the project assuming βU is -0.7 or 0 because of the 
feed-in-tariffs representing a long-term fixed-priced contract gives an APV of 14081 kEUR 
and 4345 kEUR respectively. This tremendous improvement of the APV emphasises the 
importance of carefully determining the valuation parameters. Awerbuch claims the fossil 
price movements tend to be counter-cyclical; however oil prices have historically increased 
with increasing demand in growth periods and decreased in recessions. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2010) confirms this connection between oil prices and 
market expectations. EIA points at how prices collapsed in July 2008 when the consequences 
of the financial crisis became evident. Therefore, I believe a positive asset beta is a more 
accurate input, and will base my modelling on the beta estimate of 1.60.  
Scenario analysis 
The sensitivity analysis examines the effect of changes in the various input variables 
separately. This approach provides an overview of which variables are the most sensitive, but 
may be less realistic, as variables in real-life do not change only one at a time. It is also 
unlikely that changes in the assumptions apply for the entire lifetime of the project; changes 
are more probable in the last years as the future is uncertain.  
Scenario 1: Reduced feed-in-tariffs from year 10  
Revenue risk is a central source of uncertainty for any PV project. It is unlikely that the 
promised feed-in-tariff is cancelled, but given the current uncertainty regarding the 
continuation of the FIT arrangements it may be valuable to examine the consequences of 
future reductions in the tariffs. In this scenario, I assume a reduction of 10 to 30 % is 
implemented from year 10 to year 20. Figure 11 illustrates the consequences of the tariff 
reduction. Reductions varying from 10 to 30 % are displayed on the x-axis, while APV is 
indicated on the left y-axis and IRR on the right y-axis. The red line indicates the level of the 
initial APV. The figure shows that the consequences of reduced tariffs are not very large. 
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Again, this underlines that the cost and revenue input in the model may not affect the APV as 
much as the valuation 
parameters does. The 
fact that the reduction 
in tariffs happens 10 
years ahead in time 
also contributes to 
the low effect, as the 
reduced cash flows 
are discounted 10 
years back.  
Scenario 2: Increased interest rates towards the end of the tenor 
Several of the term sheets described in section 4.1.3 included increasing interest rates towards 
the end of the loan maturity. Scenario 2 takes this into account with interest rates increasing 
from 4 % to 4.5 % in year 5, further to 5.25 % in year 9, and to 6 % from year 13 throughout 
the remaining tenor. This results in an APV of -6095 kEUR, 1.2 % higher than the initial 
value. The slight increase is due to the increase in the tax shield resulting from higher interest 
rates. The result indicates that the interest rate risk in the project is not very high. In addition, 
this risk is often hedged in an interest rate swap.  
Scenario 3: System break down and re-investment  
Technical risk is a central risk source in PV projects, which may cause production stops and 
increased costs of repair or replacement of equipment. In this scenario a technical deficiency 
causes a 40 % reduction in revenues in year 5 and re-investment the following year. The result 
of this is a 16 % reduction in APV. The event may entitle the project to an insurance 
indemnity or warranty claim mitigating the problem, but can be a bad indication for the 
project’s future performance as this may be the first symptom of a reoccurring problem.  
Financial side effects  
According to Brealey et al (2008) project finance can entail other financial side effects in 
addition to the tax shield, which should be included in the calculation of the APV. Examples 
of these are favorable interest rates or lease terms. Contracts with suppliers or customers can 
Figure 11 Reduced tariffs 
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also provide credit support. The value of these side effects should be added to the APV. In the 
case of PV projects, the government support schemes are examples of financial side effects.  
One particular form of financial side effects is real options. According to Black and Scholes 
(1973) an option is: “A security giving the right to buy or sell an asset, subject to certain 
conditions, within a specified period of time”. The connection between financial options and 
real options was put forward by Myers (1977), who firm value as the sum of the present value 
of earnings generated by the firm’s assets in place, plus present value of growth opportunities. 
The present value of growth opportunities is according to Myers “options to make further 
investments on possibly favourable terms”. Examples of real options are deferral options, 
options to abandon, options to contract or expand, switching options, compound options and 
rainbow options. The value from real options can in some situations mean the difference 
between undertaking and rejecting a project. The traditional NPV can be negative, but there is 
so much value from options that this makes up for the negative NPV. This is especially 
important for projects with a high degree of uncertainty, because this is what drives option 
value. Higher volatility of the value of the underlying asset, in the case of real options the 
present value of the project, and longer time to expiration increase the value of the option. 
Investments in renewables, so-called “green investments” may entail various real options. 
Green investments which today generate low profits or even are unprofitable can enable a 
company to take part in technology development and achieve learning curve effects, which in 
turn provides a leading position in renewables in the future. This rationale of green 
investments is confirmed in by the chief executive of SunPower who has pronounced that the 
company is “extremely well-positioned” for the shift to renewables which, according to him, 
is “an unassailable shift”26.  
BP and Shell are examples of large companies that have made investments in renewables. 
However, they both admit that these investments have problems competing with their other 
investment opportunities. In 2000 BP, the company formerly known as “British Petroleum” 
announced its new strategy in renewables and changed name to “Beyond Petroleum”, 
signaling the priority area for the company. 9 years later, the investments in renewables fell 
and renewable-energy assets were being sold off. The Economist (2009c) argues that these 
                                                 
26 The Economist (2010) 
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investments will not reach their profitability potential before investments in conventional 
energy sources cover the costs of the pollution they cause.  
Another real option in PV projects is the possibility of extending the project’s life time. The 
financial model assumes the life time is 20 years, since the fixed tariff revenue ends after 20 
years. The useful life of the technical equipment however, can be 25 to 30 years. This 
represents an option to switch to wholesale after the FIT period. The reason why this value is 
not taken into account is mainly the high degree of uncertainty and that the bank is unwilling 
to consider the values of a real option materialising in 20 years. There is uncertainty regarding 
the level of electricity prices in 20-25 years from now and technology development. The 
current technology may be outdated and not able to compete with more effective power 
generating technologies. Nevertheless, this is a real option and the value of the option should 
be added to the APV. The inherent uncertainty in the project is valuable in the valuation of the 
real option as uncertainty leads to higher option value. The sensitivity analysis confirms that 
the APV increase with longer life time, and hence indicates that the project company should 
search for other sources of revenue after the FIT period ends.  
The value of this real option comes from three sources: revenues from wholesale, refinancing 
debt, and other support arrangements not present at the time of the investment, e.g. grants, tax 
incentives, and CO2 instruments. Debt refinancing can result in better terms as most of the 
risks have been resolved. Higher performance from replaced technical components is also a 
potential source of value.   
 
6.3 Summary  
The purpose of the financial model is to evaluate the project with regards to APV, IRR and 
debt service coverage ratios. The initial assumptions result in a negative APV, indicating that 
the project is unprofitable and should be not initiated. The debt service cover ratios 
demonstrate the project’s ability to meet its obligations. The LLCR indicates that the project 
at all times is able to repay the debt and make distributions to equity holders if the project is to 
be liquidated. The negative APV of 6168 kEUR implies that the project should not be 
initiated. However, the APV is less interesting since the purpose of the thesis is to analyse the 
effects of changes in the financial model  
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The sensitivity analysis looks into what assumptions and variables are critical to the project’s 
financial viability. The project is vulnerable to changes in the feed-in-tariffs reflecting 
revenue risk and substantial risk of delay. The risk of cost overruns is low with regards to 
operating costs, but higher when it comes to the investment cost. When the predictions from 
the yield reports are considered, the APV is not very sensitive to the level of the obtained 
yield, indicating low performance risk. Further, the analysis shows that higher leverage 
increases the APV. The impact of technical risk is examined in the scenario analysis, which 
shows that the consequences of a system break down can be severe. This is especially relevant 
if the break down leads to production stop in high irradiation periods and consequently high 
revenue losses.     
Whereas changes in the input variables in the financial model do not mean much for the APV, 
the impact of changes to the valuation parameters is greater. This underlines the importance of 
carefully determining these parameters.  
The negative APV implies that the project should not be undertaken. Expanding the analysis 
to other side effects such as real options however, may alter this result. Real options are likely 
to be part of green investments, for example in terms of making strategic investments today to 
secure a favorable market position in the future. Another real option is the option to extend 
the project’s lifetime past the tariff period. The large degree of uncertainty makes the banks 
unwilling to take this value into consideration when they evaluate a project, but the sensitivity 
analysis confirms that extending the life time increases the value of the investment. Therefore, 
this real option should be valued and added to the APV.  
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7. Project finance in theory and practice  
The presented theory on project finance in section 1 explain the use of project finance with 
respect to reduced agency costs, asymmetric information, risk management and other 
investment distortions such as debt overhang.  
Risk management seems to be the explanation with the highest relevance to project finance in 
practice. The separate incorporation feature of project finance enables a parent company to 
invest in a new project without fear of how a negative outcome may affect existing business. 
The Cellino San Marco project and the Montalto di Castro project described in section 4 
illustrate how risk management plays an important part in project finance.  
Evidence from practical project finance, both from the overview of current PV projects in 
Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic, as well as the case project, confirm that 
project financed ventures employ high leverage compared to corporately financed projects.   
According to Brealey et al (2008) two thirds of corporate financing in Germany, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom are internal funds. They raise the question of whether firms rely too 
much on internal funds since this way of raising capital is more convenient than raising funds 
in the capital market and being investigated by potential investors or creditors. Avoiding the 
disciplining capital market may put managers in a more comfortable situation.  
Increasing the amount of debt in the capital structure increases the tax shield resulting from 
tax-deductible interests. There are however also costs of financial distress, for example 
bankruptcy costs increasing with debt level. According to the trade-off theory the optimal 
debt ratio is reached when the present value of the tax shield is offset by the present value of 
the costs of financial distress. Consequently, riskier firms should have lower leverage than 
safer firms, because riskier firms have a higher probability of bankruptcy. Since there are 
costs of adjusting the capital structure, companies will not be optimally financed at all times.  
Brealey et al go on to investigating whether debt levels in real-life support this theory. On one 
hand, industry differences in capital structure confirm the theory. An example is high-tech 
growth companies with intangible, risky assets having low debt levels, compared to airline 
companies with tangible, safer assets having higher debt levels. On the other hand Brealey et 
al observe that the most profitable companies tend to borrow the least.  
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Empirical evidence also suggests many companies are underlevered. Graham (2000) estimates 
the net benefit of increasing the debt level in the capital structure in a typical tax-paying 
company. He finds that increasing the leverage on average leads to a 7.5 % increase in firm 
value, indicating that most companies could benefit from more debt.  
The fact that project finance entails higher leverage than corporate finance, may indicate that 
project finance results in debt levels closer to optimal capital structure. A possible explanation 
for this is agency costs. Having debt in the capital structure is often considered unpleasant by 
managers who consequently choose not to issue debt in order to finance a new project. The 
loss of NPV of this project is therefore an agency cost. Project finance reduces the discomfort 
connected to debt by separately incorporating the project outside the parent company.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the optimal capital structure minimises the total 
agency costs consisting of agency costs of debt and agency costs of equity. Project finance 
enables higher leverage, and thereby reducing agency costs. This model does however, not 
explain how the optimal debt level is found, and disregards taxes.  
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8. Conclusion  
This thesis has analysed project finance from a theoretical and a practical perspective. The 
literature review presented theories on project finance, whereas the case study and summary 
of recent project finance deals looked into how project finance is applied in photovoltaic 
projects. The general financial model values a project and illustrates important aspects of 
financial modeling.  
The key features of project finance make this form of financing differ from other methods for 
funding a new project. The most important differences are separate incorporation and limited 
or no recourse to the sponsors. The theoretical rationale of project finance includes reduced 
consequences of agency costs, asymmetric information, and investment distortions. Contracts 
with project participants provide the core of risk management in project finance. The study on 
loan spreads by Kleimeier and Megginson finds that project finance loans have lower spreads 
than other loans. This result supports the hypothesis that project finance has competitive 
advantages over other forms of financing for certain types of projects.  
Practical aspects of project finance are examined in light of photovoltaic (PV) power plants 
which generate electricity from the sun utilising the photovoltaic effect. Photovoltaic projects 
are suited for project finance since they apply new, but proven technology, have predictable 
cash flows and few decisions to be made after commissioning. The review of recent PV deals 
suggests risk management is the most important advantage of project finance from the 
practitioners’ perspective. The web of contracts in project finance allows distribution of risks 
to the party who is best able to handle that particular risk. Various risk mitigation mechanisms 
incentivise the project participants to handle risks efficiently, thereby reducing total risk. 
However, not all risks are allocated; some risk is retained in the project and must be borne by 
the project company or the sponsors, depending on the recourse of the project debt. 
Establishing the project as a separate unit is an advantage for the sponsors, because it avoids 
risk contamination on the sponsors’ existing business. Significant risk sources in photovoltaic 
projects are technology risk, risk of delay and regulatory risk. Government subsidies in 
various forms, particularly feed-in-tariffs, have contributed to growth in the PV sector, for 
instance as experienced in Germany. Electricity generated with PV technology is not yet 
competitive with energy from conventional sources, but as the competitiveness of the industry 
is increasing, government support schemes are being phased-out.  
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The banks’ provide the greater part of funding in project finance and are key participants in 
the projects. Their involvement is concerned with reducing risk, illustrated by the many 
covenants included in the term sheets. One particular mechanism employed by the banks in 
order to protect their interests, is structuring debt repayment based on sculpting. This 
technique adjusts annual debt service to cash flows, consequently reducing free cash flow and 
ensuring repayment to the bank.  
The case study of PV Project looks into the details of the project financing of a PV plant in 
Germany. The project entails the key features described in theory, and the web of contracts 
contributes to risk management. Important contracts are the Transfer of rights agreement, the 
permits from the authorities and the EPCI contract. Examples of risk mitigation mechanisms 
used in the project are the over performance bonus in the O&M contract, the use of the same 
contractor for EPCI and O&M services to avoid potential conflicts, and an extended inverter 
warranty alleviating technical risk. The comparison of PV Project and other projects gives rise 
to certain improvement areas. Structuring the project differently could make PV Project 
achieve economies of scale, higher leverage, and better terms for the loan agreement. In 
contrast to project financed investments in other lines of business, PV Project is exposed to a 
limited number of uncertainties, faces low revenue and demand risk, but may suffer from low 
value of the project assets in default situations. Specialised assets have low redeployment 
values and provide lower credit support than more marketable asset classes.   
The comparison of theory and practice with respects to PV Project underlines the importance 
of risk management as the advantage with most practical relevance. This is confirmed in the 
general analysis. The advantages of project finance presented in the theory section may all 
apply in practice, but a broader set of case examples is needed to investigate this further. The 
general analysis also finds that project finance enables projects to obtain higher debt levels 
which may be closer to the optimal level.  
The general financial model for a photovoltaic project illustrates how a project’s financial 
viability is analysed. The sensitivity analysis revealed that the valuation parameters have a 
greater impact on the APV than the input variables which determine predicted cash flows.  
The financial model resulted in a negative APV, implying that the investment should not be 
undertaken. Taking financial side effects such as real options into the calculations could alter 
this result. Strategic considerations can come into play when green investments are initiated. 
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The intention of undertaking a seemingly less profitable project today may be that it enables a 
lucrative market position in the future. PV has great potential given increased energy demand, 
low greenhouse gas emissions, and practically unlimited availability of resources, but is still 
highly dependent on subsidies from governments. Some argue that renewables will not be 
profitable until investments in fossil fuels are required to pay for the costs they impose on the 
environment.  
A development seen in project finance the last years is increased use of the bond market. 
From 2002 to 2005 the bond market grew from 13.8m USD to 26.7m USD, partially due to 
positive experience from the U.S bond market
27
. Project Finance International (2009) 
attributes much of the increased attractiveness of the bond market to reduced availability of 
bank loans after the financial crisis, and tougher terms in form of shorter tenors and higher 
spreads and fees. 
SunRay has issued one of the first publicly-rated project bonds for solar for a 52 MW plant in 
the Lazio region of Italy. According to Project Finance Magazine (2010e) the 200m EUR 
bond issue is arranged by SG and BNP Paribas and has a maturity of 18 years. SolarWorld 
AG issued a 400m EUR bond, mainly intended for the expansion of their production site in 
Freiburg, Saxony. The bond had a maturity of 7 years and a coupon of 6.13 %. Philipp 
Koecke, CFO of SolarWorld, said this about the success of the bond issue: “With the issue of 
this bond we are continuing our successful ten-year stock exchange history and we are 
delighted with the trust that the capital market has been placing in us. This was confirmed by 
the fact that the bond was oversubscribed twice over within a very short period of time. The 
bond is another building block in our sound financial basis.”28 
In addition to the increased attractiveness of the bond market for project finance in general, 
larger PV plants may be part of why the PV industry now approaches the bond market. 
Project Finance Magazine (2010d) reports of a tendency of increasing size of PV plants. 
Currently there are three projects in Italy competing to be the biggest PV plant in Europe. The 
110 MW project by AES Solar and 123 MW project by Samsung are yet to receive full 
                                                 
27 Gatti (2008), p. 212 
28
 SolarWorld (2010) 
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authorisation, whereas the 72 MW plant by SunEdison has been granted the necessary permits 
and will be the biggest PV plant in Europe if it is completed before the two others.  
The future of PV investments is threatened by announced phase-out of feed-in-tariffs, the 
financial problems in the Euro area and the fact that the industry is still policy-driven, not 
market-driven. Project Finance Magazine (2010d) refers to a project financier arguing that the 
effect of FIT cuts will be lower leverage; from current levels of 85 % debt, to 65 %. A solar 
developer on the other hand, predicts that the cuts will be compensated by cost reductions in 
the PV industry and subsequently lower capex. The aftermath of the financial crisis combined 
with the current financial turmoil in the Euro area have lead to uncertainty regarding whether 
governments will afford to continue their subsidy arrangements. The Economist (2010) 
emphasises that two of the countries facing problems, Spain and Italy, are important 
participants in the global PV market. There are also optimists believing that the shift to 
renewable energy sources is unquestionable, and green investments will pay off in future. The 
many advantages of renewables over fossil energy sources are apparent, but the answer to 
how and when the transition will happen remains unknown.  
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Appendix 1 – List of case documents 
Indicative term sheet 
Loan agreement 
Financial model 
Technical due diligence report 
Legal due diligence report 
Profit shortfall insurance 
Facility insurance 
Third-part liability insurance 
Description of insurance 
Yield report from independent engineer 1 
Yield report from independent engineer 2 
Yield report from independent engineer 3  
Technical taking over protocol  
Transfer of rights agreement 
EPCI contract 
O&M contract 
Amendments to the O&M contract 
Land lease agreements 
Land use agreements 
Contract with the grid operator 
Building permit 
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Appendix 2 – Project financed photovoltaic projects  
PV Project finance loans - France, Germany, Italy, Czech Republic January 2009-April 2010
Project Site Size (MW) Sponsor Banks
Total value 
(€m)
Term loan 
(€m) D/V ratio Terms
Puglia 2x1 Alerion Intesa 10
Lieberose Brandenburg 53 Juwi Solar, First Solar
DZ Bank, Helaba, KfW 
IPEX, NordLB, Bremer 
Landesbank 160 130 81,3 %
17 yrs, margins about 
150bps,   50 % linear, 50 
% annuity. Debt/equity 
84/16
Puglia 4 Foresight  Centrobanca 17 15 yrs
Puglia 2 K-Energy IKB 10
ErgyCapital 
S.p.A. Serravalle 
Scriva Piemonte 6 ErgyCapital 30
Portfolio Puglia, Lecee 5 Helio Capital
Banca Popolare Etruria 
+ (unknown) 22 80-85 % debt
Fortore PV Apulia 5 Fotowatio Santander, SMBC 19,2
NextPower1 Puglia 2x1 Zouk, NextEnergy CapitalCentrobanca 14,5 12,5 86,2 %
Brindisi PV 
project Puglia 5 Enia Solaris HSH Nordbank 33,6 29 86,3 % 18 yrs
Portfolio Lazio 11 ErgyCapital UniCredit, Efibanka 50
Puglia 6 Foresight Group WestLB, Barclays 25
Fotoware 1 Italy 2 Voigt & Collegen
IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank 11,1
Cassiopea PV Montalto di Castro 24 SunRay BIIS, SG, WestLB 145 120 82,8 %
19 yrs (construction plus 
18,5 yrs)+ ca. 12m VAT 
facility. SACE guarantee. 
Margins ca 275bp 
Portfolio South Italy 4 Etrion Centrobanca 20,7 17,2 83,1 % non-recourse, D/E = 83/17
Portfolio Puglia Solareolica
Banca Popolare 
dell'Etruria e del Lazio 
Soc Cooperativa 11
10,5 EDF Energies NouvellesAuxifip, Credit Agricole 59,1 37 62,6 %
Portfolio France/Italy EDF Energies Nouvelles
EIB 500m, commercial 
banks (unknown) 500m 1000
Rain am Lech 4,6 SAG Solarstrom AG Deutsche Bank 14 10 71,4 % 18 yrs
Solar Stribro 
s.r.o. Czech rep. 13,65 SAG Solarstrom AG
Youmex AG (fin. 
advisor) 20
Walter Konzept 
Rain am Lech, 
refinancing Germany 4,6 SAG Solarstrom AG Deutsche Bank 14 10 71,4 % 18 yrs
Landes 24 of 76 EDF Energies Nouvelles
Dexi, BNP Paribas, SG + 
? (unknown) 70
Portfolio Italy 15+ Sorgenia MPS, UniCredit 70 18 yrs
Brandenburg 24,5 FinowTower Commerzbank 58 48 82,8 % 17 yrs   
France 33 GDF Suez, Eurofideme2, SEIEF
Caisse d'Epargne 
Provance-Alpes-Corse, 
SG 90
Fiumicino, Rome 10 Fotowatio, Solesa Green PowerSantander, SMBC
Les Meer 1 and 2 Provence 12+11,6 Solaire Durance, Caisse des Depots 
Natixis Energéco, 
Credit Agricole 101 83 82,2 % 18 yrs
Portfolio Puglia 16,5 Veronagest
MLAs Dexia, SG, 
UniCredit 75 19 yrs
Puglia 42x1 Global Solar Fund
CDP, UniCredit, Intesa, 
WestLB, Santander, 
BancaNova, MPS 200 18 yrs
SunProject C1 Planichka 1,3 Clean Energy and PowerLBBW Bank 7,8-8,8 ca 6 15 yrs, interest 5.5 %
Il Primo/Cellino 
San Marco PV Puglia 43 AES Solar Energy Ltd., Riverstone
SC (doc), UniCredit 
(doc), BNP Paribas 
(insur.), Credit Agricole 
CIB, Dexia Crediop. 200 172,25 86,1 % 18 yrs
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The list of project financed photovoltaic projects is based on news from the following 
sources: 
New Energy Finance - http://bnef.com/  
NREL Hotline http://www.nrel.gov/pv/news_hotline.html  
Photon International – www.photon-international.com 
Project Finance International – issues 401-430 
Project Finance Magazine – issues 297-309 
Solarbuzz – www.solarbuzz.com  
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Appendix 3 – Beta values solar companies 
 
Beta values Solar companies
Company
Country 
(stock 
exch.)
Levered 
beta, βL
Market cap 
(m) Currency Debt (m) Currency D/E
Unlevered 
beta, βU
SunPower USA 1,93 1150,00 usd 786 usd 0,68347826 1,29347522
REC Norway 1,56 16190,00 nok 11,977 nok 0,00073978 1,55916952
First Solar Germany 1,67 7518,00 eur 175 usd 0,01950517 1,64687179
Suntech USA 3,19 1570,00 usd 1679 usd 1,06942675 1,80227286
JA Solar USA 3,14 760,56 usd 1861 cny 0,35828631 2,49609262
Trina Solar USA 3,56 1100,00 usd 585 usd 0,53181818 2,57428346
Solar Thim Film Inc. USA 0,54 12,93 usd 1,988 usd 0,15375097 0,48617958
SolarWorld Germany 1,81 923,92 eur 789 eur 0,85397004 1,12084129
Canadian Solar USA 3,59 405,18 usd 387 usd 0,95513105 2,12716241
Solar Enertech Corp. USA 1,47 33,67 usd 3,239 usd 0,0961984 1,3747789
Ascent Solar Technologies USA 2,13 80,10 usd 7,313 usd 0,09129838 1,99862099
Alerion Italy 0,93 244,26 eur 253 eur 1,03578154 0,5325466
Etrion Canada 2,02 126,80 cad 1,279 usd 0,01062319 2,00466691
AVERAGE 1,6166894
Source: ft.com 08.06.2010  
 
 
